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Using a novel data of institutional investors’ bond holdings, we examine a transmission of the crisis
of 2007-2008 from the securitized bond market to the corporate bond market via joint ownership of
these bonds by investors. We posit that, ceteris paribus, corporate bonds held by investors with high
exposure to securitized bonds and liquidity needs experience greater selling pressure and price declines
(yield increases) at the onset of the crisis. We further test predictions of a model of dynamic asset liquidation:
Investors with large enough future liquidity shocks retain liquid assets, and instead sell assets that
have relatively high temporary price impacts of trading. Mutual funds with higher sensitivity of pay
to performance held higher portions of their portfolios in securitized bonds prior to the crisis. After
the onset of the crisis, these funds did not sell securitized bonds on average and instead sold corporate
bonds to meet their liquidity needs. Sales rose and yield spreads widened more for those corporate
bonds whose mutual fund holders’ portfolios were more heavily exposed to securitized bonds, compared
to same-issuer bonds held by unexposed funds. Shorter-horizon mutual funds liquidated greater portions
of their corporate bond holdings and in particular lower-rated bonds. In contrast, insurance companies
sold little regardless of their exposure as long as they were above the minimum capital ratio threshold.
These findings suggest that short-horizon mutual funds with high exposure to securitized bonds played
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Introduction  
By August 2007, the souring of the subprime mortgage market that had begun some months 
earlier turned from a bad taste in the mouth to a nearly heart-stopping assault on the financial 
body of the U.S. economy.
1 “Liquidity abruptly dried up for many firms and securities markets” 
(Getter et al. 2007, p. 9), as securitized bonds – mortgage-backed securities (MBS), asset-backed 
securities (ABS), collateralized debt obligations (CDO) and so forth – displayed sharp drops in 
their resale values and became “toxic.”
2 While much attention has focused on how these assets 
“intoxicated” banks and left them staggering, much less attention has been paid to the possibility 
of  “intoxicated  investors,”  that  is,  nonbank,  fixed-income  investors,  and,  in  particular,  bond 
mutual funds and insurance companies, which hold the majority of corporate debt securities.  
Have they been heavily exposed to these toxic assets?  Have their portfolio choices exacerbated 
the impact of the financial crisis on the real economy?  How did regulatory policy affect their 
behavior?  These are the questions we aim to explore in this paper.  
The focus on these institutional investors seems well-warranted.  By the time of the crisis, 
bond financing had become a more common source of external financing for (especially large) 
corporations.
3 Institutional  investors,  such  as  mutual  bond  funds  and  insurance  companies 
increasingly supplied the majority of capital—either directly through bond financing, or indirectly 
through investing in securitized loans. In fact, some argue that these investors’ strong demand for 
relatively safe debt instruments fueled the credit expansion and securitization boom in the U.S. in 
2003-2006.
4 Thus, their financial conditions and constraints could become as important financial 
bottlenecks as those of traditional banks on the road to the economic recovery, at least for large 
firms. For this reason, to fully understand the crisis and the way it has been transmitted to the real 
economy, it is important to look at the role of institutional investors as holders of these assets. To 
the best of our knowledge, there is very scarce evidence on this side of the equation.
5  
The primary goal of our study is to examine the role of institutional debt investors (e.g., bond 
funds and insurance companies) in propagating financial market instability. More specifically, we 
aim to study how the crisis episode in which one asset class (securitized bonds) experiences 
                                                 
1 See Gorton (2008), Gorton (2009), Gorton and Metrick (2009), and Brunnermeir (2009) for informative readings.  
2 There is no exact agreed-upon definition of what constitutes a “toxic” asset in the discussion of crisis. We use the 
definition “no-agency, securitized bonds” to capture a class of assets that have become impaired during the crisis.  
3 For large representative firms, about two-thirds of their total debt is attributable to corporate bonds and less than one-
third to bank loans (Massa, Yasuda, and Zhang, 2009).  
4 See Holmstrom (2008), Caballero et al. (2008), and Nini (2009).  
5 For  studies  that  examine  whether  skewed  incentives  of  originators  or  sellers  (e.g.,  banks,  mortgage  banks,  and 
investment banks) contributed to the unsustainable boom and the subsequent collapse of the market for securitized 
bonds, see Mian and Sufi (2008, 2009), Keys et al. (2010), Griffin and Tang (2009), and Jiang et al. (2009), among 
others.    2 
extreme  market  turmoil  accompanied  by  very  low  liquidity  affects  the  portfolio  decisions  of 
institutional investors holding this and other classes of assets. We are among the first to provide 
evidence for the transmission of the crisis via these investors’ joint ownership. We also provide 
the  first  detailed  empirical  analysis  of  professional  investor  behavior  in  the  securitized  bond 
market. We exploit a novel dataset that links individual corporate bond performances around the 
onset of the crisis to their bondholders’ exposure to securitized bonds.   
We focus on a potential transmission mechanism based on the effect of liquidity shocks on 
“open-end” institutional investors investing in securitized bond markets. Institutional investors 
that  grant  withdrawal  rights  to  clients  (e.g.,  mutual  funds)  are  subject  to  runs,  much  like 
traditional banks (see, e.g., Bernardo and Welch, 2005). The desire of these investors to hold 
liquid – and potentially high-return – assets joint with the widespread belief that the secondary 
markets for securitized bonds would remain liquid induced them to load up on these securitized 
bonds  prior  to  the  onset  of  the  crisis.
6 Indeed,  one  private  estimate  puts  these  institutional 
investors’ collective exposure higher than that of banks.
7 Once the crisis hit, these investors, left 
with significant exposure to the now more illiquid asset class, had to decide how to rebalance 
their  portfolios.  Mutual  funds,  facing  the  possibility  of  massive  withdrawals  following  bad 
performance, would have to meet the redemption claims by liquidating some of their assets. 
Reluctant to sell the more illiquid, “toxic” assets and book losses at fire sale prices (thereby 
exacerbating  the  investor  flight),  they  would  instead  sell  other,  more  liquid  assets,  such  as 
corporate bonds.  
In contrast, another class of institutional investors (e.g., insurance companies and pension 
funds) — which face longer-term investors and are equipped with long lock-ups, penalties for 
early withdrawals, and predictable payout schedules — were less pressured to sell than mutual 
funds, especially in the event of temporary deviations of prices from fundamentals. However, for 
these institutional investors, capital regulations made it expensive to hold lower-rated bonds.  
Thus, we expect that, while the investor horizon influences the reaction of mutual funds, 
regulatory capital constraints influence the portfolio decisions of insurance companies when/if 
downgrades occur.  
                                                 
6 Shleifer and Vishny (2009), Gorton and Metrick (2009), and others describe an ecosystem of the so-called “shadow 
banking system” where broker-dealer banks actively supported liquidity of securitized bonds by acting as market 
makers and at the same time funded their balance sheets in the repo market using the same bonds as collateral. 
7 Blundell-Wignall (2007) quotes a private investment bank estimate where insurance companies and asset managers 
together are shown to have delta-adjusted exposure to 28.6% of existing CDOs, whereas hedge funds and banks split 
the remaining exposure at 46.5% and 24.9%, respectively.     3 
This distinction offers us a unique event to test how different classes of institutional investors 
subject to different demand conditions and regulatory constraints would react to the crisis. More 
importantly, it offers us a unique opportunity to look at the transmission mechanism from the 
securitization market to other, seemingly unrelated, asset classes, such as corporate bonds. In the 
case of mutual funds, a drop in the resale value of one subclass of assets in the portfolio and the 
ensuing reduction in the value of the portfolio induces the investor to rebalance his portfolio, for 
example,  to  prepare  for  potential  redemption  requests.  In  contrast,  insurance  companies  are 
expected not to respond unless the bonds are downgraded. 
The key question is which assets the investor would choose to sell and who would put the 
selling pressure on assets more than others. We posit that, ceteris paribus, corporate bonds held 
by  investors  with  high  exposure  to  securitized  bonds  and  liquidity  needs  experience  greater 
selling pressure and price declines (yield increases) at the onset of the crisis. The idea that an 
investor who faces a liquidation problem and holds both liquid and illiquid assets in his portfolio 
would first sell the more liquid assets is intuitive and is suggested by Scholes (2000) and others. 
“A ‘systemic shock’ … is an event that causes [securitized] debt to become informationally-
sensitive, that is, sensitive to adverse selection” and “cause[s] the (inefficient) collapse of trading 
in  [such]  debt.”  (Gorton  2009,  p.10)
8   In  response  to  this  negative  shock  to  their  portfolios, 
investors with liquidity needs would choose to retain the securitized bonds and sell other, more 
liquid assets. As to which types of corporate bonds investors would choose to sell, we further test 
predictions of a model of dynamic asset liquidation: Investors with large enough potential future 
liquidity shocks retain “assets with a low temporary [price] impact of trading” (e.g., investment-
grade bonds), and instead sell “relatively illiquid assets” (e.g., junk bonds). (Brown et al. 2009, p. 
3) 
We  collect  information  on  mutual  funds  at  the  individual  fund  level  and  on  insurance 
companies  at  the  company  level.  We  use  a  novel  dataset  of  quarterly  portfolio  holdings  of 
securitized bonds and corporate bonds by institutional investors from 1998Q1 to 2008Q1. The 
empirical analysis is conducted both at the investor level and at the individual corporate bond 
level. That is, we examine (i) investors’ portfolio choices as functions of their attributes (e.g., 
horizon, performance sensitivity of pay, and affiliation with banks and big financial groups), as 
                                                 
8 Gorton and Metrick (2009) find that collateral values of securitized bonds (reflected in repo haircut rates) collapsed 
after the onset of the crisis across all collateral types, including even those that were not subprime-related. Gorton 
(2009) also discusses how “market participants are not prepared to cope with the sudden information requirements for 
understanding, valuing, and trading securities that are suddenly information-sensitive. … This makes them illiquid.” (p. 
37)     4 
well as (ii) the yield spread changes and net sales of individual corporate bonds as functions of 
their current bondholders’ attributes, such as their exposure to now-illiquid, securitized bonds.  
We start by examining whether and why institutional investors hold securitized bonds in the 
first place. Indeed, theory suggests that institutional investors with short horizon will not invest in 
undervalued assets that are not expected to recover in value soon. However, institutional investors 
may have been attracted to hold securitized bonds prior to the crisis because these assets were 
perceived to be liquid, and because they exhibited relatively high ratings and relatively attractive 
yields. The practice of “rating at the edge” might also have understated the perceived riskiness of 
these assets.  
We find that institutional investors’ holdings of securitized bonds increased fourfold during 
the sample period, totaling nearly $2 trillion in 2007. About 80% of these (with known ratings) 
were AAA-rated. By comparison, only 10% of the institutional investors’ holdings of corporate 
bond holdings (around $3 trillion as of 2007) were AAA-rated. Also, overall, the pool of AAA-
rated corporate bonds grew much more slowly during the sample period. As a result, there was a 
sharp increase in their holdings of securitized bonds as a percentage of AAA-rated assets during 
the sample period. Among mutual funds, the funds with higher sensitivity of pay to performance 
held larger portions of their portfolios in securitized bonds.  
These  results  are  consistent  with  the  idea  that,  when  general  confidence  in  the  enduring 
liquidity  of  the  securitized  bond  market  was  high,  mutual  funds  with  high  pay-performance 
sensitivity were incentivized to load up on these assets. And indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests 
that highly rated securitized bonds were favored by institutional investors, which are constrained 
to invest mostly in highly rated assets and which wanted to “spice up” their performance for 
competitive reasons. The result is also consistent with empirical evidence on hedge fund behavior 
at the top of the bubble (e.g., Brunnermeier and Nagel 2004). Funds affiliated with banks also 
held more securitized bonds. 
After establishing that institutional investors had significant exposure to the securitization 
market before the crisis, we focus on the investors’ liquidation problem as the crisis impairs 
liquidity and the resale values of their holdings. We predict that as the crisis hits, mutual fund 
investors with prior holdings will choose not to sell these assets immediately, as fire sales and 
realized losses may trigger large outflows and further exacerbate their liquidity problem. At the 
same time, having significant exposure to these now highly illiquid assets may force them to 
liquidate other assets in order to meet current withdrawal requests or in anticipation of future 
withdrawal requests.    5 
We consider both the traditional “static” Scholes approach and a more dynamic liquidation 
model.  Given  the  different  implications  of  the  dynamic  liquidation  model  from  the  more 
traditional  framework  for  the  transmission  of  the  crisis,  we  first  investigate  the  hypotheses 
common to both models and then proceed with those more specific to each particular model. 
Specifically, a common prediction of both the Scholes and the dynamic liquidation model is that 
investors faced with a liquidation problem will not sell the most illiquid assets in the initial period. 
And  indeed,  as  theory  predicts,  we  document  a  strong  negative  relationship  between  the  net 
percentage changes in portfolio holdings and the liquidity of the assets. In the last quarter of 2007, 
the mutual funds reduced the holdings of corporate bonds in their portfolios by -15% (-6% of 
total holdings), while they reduced their holdings of securitized bonds by -9% (-1.9% of total 
holdings). During the same period, insurance companies are small net purchasers, increasing their 
holdings of corporate bonds and securitized bonds by just 1.9% and 0.3% of their total holdings, 
respectively.  
When  the  subprime  mortgage  crisis  hit  the  market  in  August  2007,  mutual  funds  sold 
corporate  bonds  to  meet  their  increased  demand  for  liquidity.  Shorter-horizon  mutual  funds 
liquidated greater portions of their corporate bond holdings. Affiliated funds also tended to sell 
more corporate bonds and retain securitized bonds. This may be a signal of better (actual or 
perceived) information as well as less fear about holding on to these toxic assets as these funds 
may  count  on  implicit  guarantees  from  the  groups  they  are  affiliated  with  in  case  of  future 
liquidity needs. Among insurance companies, only the firms close to or below the risk-based 
capital threshold engaged in selling the toxic assets.  
We then try to differentiate between the traditional Scholes-type model and the dynamic 
liquidation model by further examining the type of corporate bonds that were sold more around 
the onset of the crisis. We find that, in line with the dynamic liquidation hypothesis, the average 
investor tended to sell the junk bonds more than investment-grade bonds. The change in holdings 
of the investors after the onset of the crisis also depended on the investor horizon. One standard 
deviation shorter horizon translates to a 6% higher sale of junk bonds and to a significantly 
smaller impact on the sale of investment-grade bonds.  
Next we turn to the transmission of the shocks from the securitization market to the corporate 
bond market via corporate bondholders’ exposure to securitized bonds. We show that bond yield 
spreads widened more and net sales were larger for those bonds whose holders’ portfolios were 
more heavily exposed to securitized bonds, and particularly more so for lower-rated bonds. An 
increase in the holdings of securitized bonds in the portfolio of the average investor from 0% to   6 
50% translates to a 70 bps increase in the yield spread of a corporate bond after the onset of the 
crisis. In line with the dynamic liquidation hypothesis and the previous findings, the effect is 
sharper  for  lower-rated  bonds.  Selling  pressure  on  these  lower-rated  corporate  bonds  came 
primarily from mutual fund investors with high exposure to securitized bonds, while insurance 
company investors contributed to a lesser degree to the trading volumes during the second half of 
2007.  
It is important to stress that in our analysis of corporate bond yields (and trading volumes) we 
include  bond  issuer  dummy  variables  (firm  fixed  effects).  This  is  crucial  for  identification. 
Effectively, we compare the yield spread change of a bond held by exposed investors to another 
bond issued by the same firm but held by non-exposed investors, holding constant any issuer-
specific characteristics (both observable traits, such as credit ratings, as well as unobservable, 
idiosyncratic traits). This drastically reduces the endogeneity concerns that inclusion of a bond in 
exposed investors’ portfolios could be correlated with some unobserved characteristics about the 
issuing firm.  
Our findings support the view that the sharp increase in yield spreads of lower-rated bonds at 
the start of the crisis is at least partly due to the contagion of the shock from (mostly AAA-rated) 
securitized bond market to the lower-rated corporate bond market via the joint ownership of both 
securities by mutual funds.  Figure 1 illustrates this point. 
Overall our results show that performance-sensitive and short-horizon mutual fund investors 
loaded up on securitized bonds (which were highly rated and yielded higher returns than Treasury 
bonds) during the boom years.  When faced with liquidity shocks at the onset of the crisis, these 
funds sold corporate bonds, thereby transmitting the crisis from securitized bonds to corporate 
bonds.
9 In the clearest evidence of the channel, the effects were manifested in greater spread 
increases  for  individual  corporate  bonds  that  are  held  by  investors  with  heavy  exposure  to 
securitized  bonds,  compared  to  same-issuer  bonds  held  by  unexposed  investors.  Figure  2 
illustrates this point. 
Our results have important policy implications. In particular, they suggest that the initial 
transmission of the crisis from the securitization market to the corporate bond market is primarily 
caused  by  actions  of  short-horizon  mutual  funds,  whereas  long-horizon  mutual  funds  and 
insurance companies contributed less to the sales of corporate bonds. This implies that regulations 
                                                 
9 Longstaff (2010) finds that declines in subprime-related asset values forecast widening of corporate bond spreads with 
a lag after the onset of the crisis, especially in 2007. The result is consistent with a liquidity channel of contagion. Our 
results suggest that portfolio holdings of institutional investors provide one such channel.     7 
intended  to  delay  panic-induced  withdrawals  –  e.g.,  lock-up  clauses  –  may  prevent  the 
transmission of the crisis. This is in line with anecdotal evidence suggesting that hedge funds 
have  been  better  able  to  withstand  the  withdrawal  pressure.  Our  results  also  highlight  the 
vulnerability of companies that depend on mutual funds as primary bond investors.
10  
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  discusses  the  hypotheses. 
Section  3  describes  the  construction  of  the  sample,  our  key  variables,  and  sample  summary 
statistics. Section 4 presents the analysis of investors’ demand for securitized bonds prior to the 
crisis. Section 5 presents the analyses of mutual funds’ portfolio decisions around the onset of the 
crisis  in  the  summer  of  2007.  Section  6  presents  the  bond-level  analysis  of  the  effects  of 
investors’ exposure to securitized bonds on corporate bonds’ yields and trading volumes. Section 
7 concludes.  
2. Hypotheses 
The idea that an investor who faces a liquidation problem and holding both liquid and illiquid 
assets in his portfolio would first sell the more liquid assets is intuitive and is suggested by 
Scholes (2000) and others.  We posit that, given the negative shock to the securitization market at 
the onset of the crisis, and the severity of the adverse selection problem in the secondary market 
for securitized bonds, investors with liquidity needs would choose to retain them and sell other, 
more liquid assets.  
Hypothesis 1:  Securitized bonds will not be prioritized for sales at the onset of the crisis. 
Second, the larger the expected liquidity needs in the future, the more investors will liquidate 
today in a precautionary manner. This implies that the more vulnerable the investors are to the 
future liquidation problem, the more they will liquidate in the first period. To test this prediction, 
we need to measure the future liquidity needs of the investors. We draw on the literature on limits 
of arbitrage (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Coval and Stafford, 2007) and use the investment 
horizon as our key measure of the investors’ anticipated liquidity needs. We argue that this is a 
good measure for mutual funds, since short-horizon mutual funds are likely to receive larger 
withdrawal  requests  as  a  result  of  their  exposure  to  (now  illiquid)  securitized  bonds.  In  this 
context,  the s econd  hypothesis  is  thus  that,  the  shorter  the  horizon,  the  larger  the  potential 
liquidity shock, and thus the more they liquidate.  
                                                 
10 Massa, Yasuda, and Zhang (2009) find that corporations whose local bond investors are primarily mutual funds 
depend less on bond financing and have lower leverage, compared to firms whose local bond investors are primarily 
insurance companies.    8 
 
Hypothesis  2:  The  investment  horizon  of  the  investors  is  negatively  associated  with  the 
magnitudes of their liquidation decision.  
Third, and most importantly, we posit that, ceteris paribus, corporate bonds held by investors 
with high exposure to securitized bonds and liquidity needs experience greater selling pressure 
and price declines (yield increases) at the onset of the crisis. The magnitude of the transmission 
should be a function of the stock of securitized bonds that the investors accumulated before the 
crisis. Mutual funds seek to maintain relatively stable risk and style characteristics to satisfy their 
objectives. The “shock” to the securitized bond market has left the funds with “toxic” holdings 
that are riskier and less liquid than they had anticipated. To cut back the heightened portfolio risk 
level, the funds with (now illiquid) securitized bond holdings would choose to liquidate corporate 
bonds. We therefore argue that, the larger the exposure of investors holding corporate bonds, the 
more they are sold, and the more negatively the prices of the bonds are impacted. We examine 
this hypothesis by constructing holders’ exposure measures, yield spread changes, and trading 
volumes at the individual asset (i.e., corporate bond) level.  
Hypothesis  3:  For  a  given  corporate  bond,  mutual  fund  investors’  portfolio  exposure  to 
securitized bonds is positively associated with yield spread changes (negatively associated with 
asset price changes) and positively associated with trading volumes.  
As to which types of corporate bonds investors would choose to sell, we build our secondary 
hypotheses on a model of dynamic asset liquidation by Brown et al. (2009),
11 which, in turn, 
builds  on  the  Scholes  conjecture.  The  Scholes  conjecture  states  that  investors  who  face  an 
immediate liquidation problem in a one-period setting sell off the most liquid assets to exactly 
meet the liquidity need.  In such a myopic setting, investors do not consider the liquidity needs in 
the future (second) period.  Scholes himself points out that, as a result, the investor’s portfolio 
becomes much more illiquid than it was at the beginning of the period. This implies a positive 
correlation between the drop in the value of securitized bonds and the increase in the yields of 
highly-rated corporate bonds. That is, it posits a direct transmission of a shock from securitized 
bonds to the highly-rated bond segment. 
The Brown et al. (2009) model points out a trade-off between selling the more liquid assets 
first (and thus limiting the immediate loss) and holding on to liquid assets (and thereby protecting 
against a future liquidity shock) when investors face a multi-period liquidation problem. The 
main  implication  of  the  model  is  that,  investors  with  large  enough  potential  future  liquidity 
                                                 
11 Also see Carlin et al. (2007).    9 
shocks  retain  liquid  assets  (e.g.,  investment-grade  bonds),  and  instead  sell  assets  that  have 
relatively  high  temporary  price  impacts  of  trading  (e.g.,  junk  bonds).  This  leads  to  a  sub-
hypothesis that accompanies Hypothesis 2, as follows:   
Hypothesis  2b:  The  investment  horizon  of  mutual  funds  is  positively  associated  with  the 
temporary liquidity of the assets they sell.
12 
  The  model  also  highlights  the  importance  of  differentiating  between  permanent  and 
temporary impacts of trading on prices.  In particular, the model predicts that investors will not 
sell  assets  with  a  high  permanent  price  impact  when  faced  with  a  liquidation  problem.  The 
permanent  (as  opposed  to  temporary)  price  impact  is  defined  in  terms  of  the  information 
asymmetry about the value of the asset. This concept became very relevant during the crisis as the 
information  sensitivity  of  securitized  bonds  jumped  dramatically  at  the  onset  of  the  crisis, 
switching  from  seemingly  information-insensitive  (simple  and  transparent)  debt  that  required 
little  research  to  information  sensitive  debt  with  structural,  informational,  and  institutional 
complexity that few holders were equipped to evaluate. Thus, the model’s prediction with respect 
to securitized bonds is in line with Hypothesis 1.   
  The model also suggests a specific transmission of the shock from securitized bonds to the 
lower-rated corporate bonds. The larger the exposure of investors holding a particular asset and 
the higher the temporary price impact of trading, the more they will be sold in the first period, and 
the more negatively the price of the asset will be impacted. This leads to a sub-hypothesis that 
accompanies Hypothesis 3, as follows:  
Hypothesis 3b: For a given corporate bond, the impact of mutual fund investors’ exposure to 
securitized bonds on yield changes and bond sales is larger, the lower rated the bond is.  
Note  that  this  sub-hypothesis  is  not  exclusive  to  the  Brown  et  al.  (2009)’s  model.  It  is  also 
supported by our general idea of contagion, namely, that the shock to the securitized bond market 
prompted  re-balancing  by  exposed  mutual  funds  to  revert  to  their  target  risk  levels,  thus 
triggering a transmission to lower-rated corporate bonds.
13   
3. Data  
3.1 Data Sources  
                                                 
12 We will measure the temporary price impact of bonds using both bond ratings and actual trade-based metrics. In 
Table VII we show that lower-rated bonds indeed trade in significantly smaller numbers.  
13 For related studies that examine the role of international investors in spreading crises through re-balancing of their 
cross-country asset holdings, see, e.g., Boyer et al. (2006) and the papers cited therein.    10 
We construct our sample by merging a number of different data sources: the Lipper EMAXX 
institutional  bond  holdings  database,  Thomson  Financial’s  13f  Institutional  Holdings, 
CDA/Spectrum, the CRSP Mutual Funds dataset, and the Mergent FISD Corporate Bond Dataset.  
The  Lipper  EMAXX  database  contains  details  of  corporate  bond  and  securitized  bond  
(mortgage- or asset-backed securities, collateralized debt, mortgage, or loan obligations, and their 
variants) holdings for nearly 20,000 U.S. and European insurance companies, U.S., Canadian, and 
European  mutual  funds,  and  leading  U.S.  public  pension  funds.  It  provides  information  on 
quarterly ownership of more than 50,000 fixed-income issuers with over $7 trillion in total par 
amount  from  1998Q1  to  2008Q1.  We  focus  on  U.S.  institutional  investors  in  the  EMAXX 
database,  and  their  holdings  of  corporate  bonds  and  structured  products  (about  15,000 
institutional investors every quarter, holding in aggregate a total face value of about $300M per 
institution on average in any given quarter). For these institutions, Lipper EMAXX reports the 
holdings based on regulatory disclosure to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC, for insurance companies) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, for mutual 
funds),  and  on  voluntary  disclosure  by  the  major  pension  funds.
14 Thomson  Financial’s  13f 
dataset  contains  information  on  the  equity  positions  of  investment  companies  holding  U.S. 
equities.  
3.2 Empirical Proxies  
To conduct our analyses, we need empirical proxies for investment horizons. An investor has a 
short investment horizon if his ability to stay invested in the long run is perceived to be low.  One 
reason for a short horizon may be an investor’s uncertainty about the potential for redemption 
calls, which would require him to liquidate his position (e.g., Edelen 1999); that is, the more 
volatile  the  fund  flows,  the  shorter  the  average  investment  horizon  of  such  a  fund  will  be. 
Therefore our first proxy of horizon is the volatility of flows, where the higher the flow volatility, 
the lower the horizon should be.  
An alternative way to measure the investment horizon is by focusing on the actual trades by 
the investors. The standard literature (e.g., Q. Chen et al., 2007, Gaspar et al., 2006) suggests that 
investors who turn over their portfolios more often have a shorter investment horizon. This may 
be due to the need to face redemptions as well as tax considerations. Long-term investors dislike 
high turnover portfolios as this can result in undesirable short-term taxable capital gains (Jin 
                                                 
14 Importantly, EMAXX provides par amount holdings, which enables us to measure quantity changes (as opposed to 
market value changes) in investors’ holdings of various bonds.     11 
2006). Conversely, short-horizon investors are more likely to be matched with portfolio managers 
with high turnover. Therefore, portfolio turnover is our second proxy of investment horizon, 
where the higher the turnover of the portfolio, the shorter the investment horizon of the investor 
should be. We measure flow volatility as the standard deviation of the fund’s flow, over the 
previous 12 months. We use as the fund’s turnover ratio the CRSP Mutual Funds turnover ratio. 
We also construct proxies for investor relationships. Relationships could affect investors’ 
portfolio decisions through either pure information effects or additional incentive effects. The 
first relationship variable, Affiliated with commercial banks, captures the affiliation with financial 
conglomerates  that  also  own  the  banks  that  participate  in  the  securitized  debt  markets  and 
perform due diligence on the instruments. This implies that these investors have an informational 
advantage  over  unaffiliated  investors.  This  variable  may  also  capture  the  fact  that  affiliated 
investors  are  less  risk  averse  than  unaffiliated  investors  as  they  receive  implicit  buyback 
guarantees from their affiliate banks in case of market turmoil. It may also capture any pressure 
the funds receive from originating affiliate banks to buy their securitized bonds, especially if the 
banks, unable to sell the bonds to third parties, used their affiliate funds as dumping grounds. The 
second relationship variable captures affiliation with large asset management groups (Log(Family 
size)). In contrast to the first measure, this is a pure information measure.  
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
We report summary statistics in Table I. Panel A reports the securitized bond and corporate bond 
holdings  by  mutual  funds  and  insurance  companies.  Institutional  investors’  holdings  of 
securitized bonds increased fourfold during the sample period, totaling nearly $2 trillion in 2007. 
While asset holdings grew steadily for both classes of institutional investors over most of the pre-
crisis  period,  mutual  funds’  holdings  of  securitized  bonds  in  the  2004-2007  period  grew 
particularly rapidly, doubling in just 3 years; in contrast, insurance companies’ holdings grew 
more gradually. There is also a large contraction in the mutual funds’ holdings of corporate bonds 
in the last quarter of 2007.  
  Panel B reports the securitized bond and corporate bond holdings of mutual funds by ratings. 
It is striking that nearly 80% of securitized bonds (with known ratings) held by the sample mutual 
funds are AAA-rated, with just a handful of non-AAA, investment-grade tranches, and virtually 
no junk-rated tranches (statistics for insurance companies are similar). In contrast, the majority of 
corporate bonds held by mutual funds are investment-grade but lower than AAA-rated.  This is 
not surprising, as the number of AAA-rated corporate issuers steadily dwindled over the years,   12 
from more than 60 in the 1980s to just 6 as of the end of 2008. As we argued above, institutional 
investors had great appetite for securitized bonds because the securitization methodology enabled 
the creation of informationally insensitive, highly rated debt in vast quantities.  The summary 
statistics reported here corroborate this view. Mutual funds also hold a higher percentage of their 
corporate bond portfolios in junk-rated bonds than insurance companies.  This is consistent with 
the fact that risk-based capital regulation makes it expensive for insurance companies to hold 
low-rated bonds (see, for example, Herring and Schuermann, 2003).   
Panel C reports AAA-rated bond holdings as a percentage of the total portfolio. For both 
classes of institutional investors, holdings of AAA-rated bonds grew sharply, both as percentage 
of their total portfolios and in absolute value, during the sample period. For mutual funds, it grew 
from about 3% of the total to 12%, and for insurance companies it grew from about 6% to 16%. 
In both cases, the growth came disproportionately from the growth in securitized bond holdings.  
Panel D presents securitized bond holdings by collateral type (residential mortgage-backed 
securities  (RMBS),  commercial  mortgage-backed  securities  (CMBS),  other  asset-backed 
securities (ABS), and government agency-backed securities (Agency)). Panels D-1 and D-3 show 
all securitized bonds, and Panels D-2 and D-4 show AAA-rated bonds only. In general, RMBS is 
the most common collateral type throughout the sample period, though the portfolios become 
more diversified among the four collateral types over time. CMBS appears to be more popular 
among the insurance companies than among mutual funds. The opposite is true for ABS, which 
can be backed by a wide variety of assets, including credit card debt, student loans, auto loans, etc. 
Finally,  Agency  is  not  a  dominant  fraction  of  portfolios;  i.e.,  investors  primarily  invested  in 
privately issued securitized bonds. 
Panel E reports the summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. Note that 
the unit of observations (with N.Obs = 16252) for Tables II and IV is a fund-quarter, whereas the 
unit of observations (with N.Obs = 8148) for Tables III (Panel A) and V-VII is a corporate bond.  
For example, Turnover ratio and Flow volatility in Panel E-1 report the sample statistics (across 
fund-quarters) for the two proxies of investment horizons for our sample of mutual funds. There 
is a great amount of variability in these measures; e.g., flow volatility ranges from 0.0031 to 
0.3987.  
Another variable in Panel E-1, Affiliated with Commercial Bank, indicates that about one- 
quarter of the sample funds are affiliated with banks. The variable No equity (which equals 1 if 
the fund does not hold equity), indicates that about four-fifths of our sample mutual funds are 
pure bond funds that do hold no equity, while the remaining one-fifth are blend funds with some   13 
holdings of equity.  Other variables are standard mutual fund characteristics used in the literature: 
for definitions of other variables in the table, see the Appendix. 
In contrast to Panel E-1 in which the variables are defined at the fund level, the variables in 
Panel E-2 are defined at the level of the individual corporate bonds that are held by our sample 
funds.  For example, the first two variables, LogSale (Jul-Oct 2007) and LogSale (Jul-Dec 2007), 
measure the log of net sales of a given corporate bond by the sample mutual funds. The next two 
variables, ∆YS, measure the change in yield spreads of corporate spreads between the pre-crisis 
2007 Q2 and the crisis (periods of) 2007 Q3 and 2007 Q4, respectively.  On average, bond yield 
spreads increase by approximately 1% in the first 3 months of the crisis, and nearly 2% in the first 
6 months, as indicated by the mean of these variables.  The average masks the great variability, 
however, in that the yields of some bonds hardly change, while others shoot up sharply.  
The variable Holders’ Exposure (to Securitized Bonds) is of significant interest. It measures 
how much an average mutual fund investor holding corporate bond i is exposed to securitized 
bonds that become illiquid and impaired at the onset of the crisis. The sample statistics indicate 
that investors’ exposure varies widely from none to very high (over 90%).  We similarly measure 
and  report  the  exposure  of  the  average  insurance  firm  investor  holding  corporate  bond  i  to 
securitized bonds. It appears that the average exposure is higher for insurance company investors 
than for mutual funds, but the variance is not larger. In Section 6, we will examine whether the 
exposure of existing investors to securitized bonds explains some of the increases in corporate 
bond yields at the onset of the crisis. Other variables are standard bond characteristics used in the 
literature. The definitions of the other variables are provided in the Appendix. 
4.  Investor  Demand  for  Securitized  Bonds  Before  the 
Crisis 
What determines the overall levels of holdings of securitized debt by institutional bond investors 
in  general  and  mutual  funds  in  particular?  As  we  argued,  one  of  the  main  features  of  these 
securitized debt tranches (especially AAA-rated tranches) was the fact that they offered slightly 
more attractive yields than Treasury bonds of similar ratings and maturity. Indeed, the prevailing 
rating system understated their risk relative to corporate bonds,
15 while the promised yield made 
                                                 
15 “’Rating at the edge’ might also have contributed to favorable ratings of structured products versus corporate bonds; 
while a AAA-rated bond represents a band of risk ranging from a near-zero default risk to a risk that just makes it into 
the AAA-rated group, banks worked closely with the rating agencies to ensure that AAA tranches were always sliced in 
such a way that they just crossed the dividing line to reach the AAA rating.” (Brunnermeir 2009, p.81)  For studies that   14 
these instruments attractive especially for investors for whom a higher performance would have 
been  more  valuable,  e.g.,  the  investors  with  short  horizons,  and  those  with  high  flow- 
performance sensitivity. And there appeared to be little illiquidity penalty associated with holding 
these securities prior to the crisis, in light of the fact that investment banks frequently used them 
as collateral in accessing the repo market, and banks kept them in their off-balance sheet SIVs, 
which were financed using short-term asset-backed commercial paper.
16 
We therefore expect that, among mutual funds, the funds with shorter horizons and funds 
with  higher  flow-performance  sensitivity  would  hold  more  securitized  debt.  The  former 
prediction may be counterintuitive in a simplified, limits-of-arbitrage story, as the investors who 
hold more illiquid assets should be the ones with longer horizons. However, participants may not 
have anticipated that securitized bonds would become highly illiquid and might have found these 
bonds  attractive  since  they  exhibited  relatively  high  credit  ratings  and  relatively  high  yields.  
Alternatively, participants, even if aware of a liquidity bubble, may have decided to ride the wave 
rather than betting against it,
17 loading up on potentially riskier assets (e.g., Brunnermeier and 
Nagel 2004).
18  
We  estimate  the  effects  of  mutual  funds’  flow-performance  sensitivity  and  investment 
horizon on their portfolio holdings by estimating the following model:  
€ 
Hit =α + β Flow - Performance Sensitivity (alternatively Horizon)it + γ'xit +εit   (1), 
where each observation represents the portfolio composition of a given mutual fund in a given 
quarter. The dependent variable H is alternatively the fraction of the fund’s portfolio invested in 
either  securitized  bonds  or  corporate  bonds.
19 We  define  the  variable  Flow-performance 
sensitivity based on Huang et al. (2007) and discuss its construction in the Appendix. Horizon is 
one of the two proxies for the investment horizon of the fund – Flow volatility or Turnover ratio. 
X is a set of fund characteristics (Affiliated with commercial bank, Log(Family Size), the fund’s 
flow in the previous quarter (Past Flow), the fund’s return in the previous quarter (Fund return), 
                                                                                                                                                 
examine how various tranches of securitized debt (e.g., CDOs) were priced, see, e.g., Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2008) 
and Longstaff and Myers (2009).   
16 See Gorton and Metrick (2009).  
17 “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve 
got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.” (Chuck Prince, former CEO of Citigroup, quoted on July 10, 2007, in 
Financial Times shortly before the onset of the crisis)  
18 Also note that we do not expect mutual funds to hold more securitized bonds than insurance companies, since the 
mechanism governing insurance companies’ decisions to hold securitized bonds is expected to be distinct from that 
governing mutual fund decisions, as we posit above. Thus, we examine the effect of pay-performance sensitivity, flow 
volatility, etc., on holdings using only the mutual fund sample. Indeed, as shown in Table I, insurance companies in the 
aggregate held a higher percentage of their portfolios in securitized bonds than did mutual funds.   
19 They are not mere complements of each other, because there is a third component, namely, equity.    15 
the equity holdings of the fund’s family (Family equity holdings), management fees (Mgmt fee), 
Expense ratio, Actual 12b1, Average maturity (of the fund’s fixed income holdings), an indicator 
variable for whether the fund holds equity or not, and the return on the fund’s equity holdings 
(Equity return)).  
We estimate the model using both Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression (with Newey-
West standard errors with lag length parameter equal to 4), and a pooled OLS with quarter fixed 
effects and standard errors clustered around each fund (Petersen 2009). The sample includes all 
the  mutual  funds  belonging  to  the  merged  Lipper  eMAXX-CDA/Spectrum  data  set  over  the 
period 1998Q1-2007Q2.
2021 
The results are reported in Table II. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the fraction of the 
fund’s  portfolio  represented  by  securitized  bonds.  In  Panel  B,  the  dependent  variable  is  the 
fraction of the fund’s portfolio represented by corporate bonds. In columns (1)-(3) the model is 
estimated using the Fama-MacBeth; in columns (4)-(6), it is estimated as a pooled OLS.  
The results show a strong correlation between the investors’ horizons and their investments in 
securitized bonds. The effect is not only statistically significant, but also economically relevant. 
All else equal, a fund in the top decile of Turnover (Flow volatility) holds 49% (40%) of its 
portfolio in securitized bonds, while a fund in the bottom decile holds only 36% (37%). Funds 
with high flow-performance sensitivity also hold significantly higher portions of their portfolios 
in securitized bonds.   
The fund affiliation also plays a significant role. Funds that are affiliated with commercial 
banks display a higher percentage of securitized bond ownership. This finding is consistent with 
both (i) inside/higher quality information received by the funds thanks to their affiliation and (ii) 
implicit guarantees by their affiliate banks that effectively subsidize these funds’ holdings in the 
event of market turmoil. The anecdotal evidence about Citigroup’s infusion of cash into its own 
money market funds to keep them afloat is consistent with this latter interpretation.
22  
                                                 
20 The merged dataset consists of both pure bond funds (about 80% of the sample) and blend funds, which hold some 
equity (about 20%). In unreported analysis, we re-estimate the models reported in Tables II and IV using only pure 
bond funds and find that the results are qualitatively unchanged.  
21 While many observers of the crisis point to August 2007 as the first month in which financial contagion or systemic 
risk surfaced (as reflected, e.g., in the sharp rise in the LIBOR-OIS spread, shown in Figure 1), subprime market 
indicators (e.g., ABX) exhibited localized disruptions as early as 2007Q1. Thus, as a robustness check, we also re-run 
the model using data up to 2006Q4 rather than 2007Q2 and find that results are qualitatively unchanged.  
22 Tangentially, we examine fund performance following the onset of the crisis and find that bank-affiliated funds 
underperform because their portfolios are heavy in securitized bond holdings. This result is consistent with the view 
that affiliated mutual funds exercised less scrutiny when increasing their holdings of securitized bonds; however, the 
sample period is quite short after the onset of the crisis, and we stress the need for caution in drawing definitive 
conclusions from this evidence.   16 
Among the control variables, it is interesting to note that funds with higher expense ratios 
hold more in corporate bonds and less in securitized bonds. One possible interpretation is that a 
corporate  bond  is  considered  more  information-sensitive  than  a  securitized  bond  because  its 
default risk contains more idiosyncratic risk about the firm. Therefore, funds with more active 
investment strategies (and higher expenses) gravitate towards corporate bonds, whereas funds 
with  lower  expenses  choose  to  hold  securitized  bonds.  The  equity  focus  of  fund  families  is 
negatively associated with portfolio weights of both corporate bonds and securitized bonds.  This 
may be because prominent pure bond funds tend to be part of fund families that are focused on 
fixed-income securities (e.g., PIMCO).    
Overall, these results show that the performance sensitive and shorter-horizon mutual funds 
loaded heavily on securitized bonds prior to the crisis. We now turn to examining their behavior 
after the onset of the crisis. 
5. Selling Behavior after the Onset of the Crisis  
5.1 Who sells and what gets sold after the onset of the crisis?  
We now consider the first prediction regarding the mutual funds’ liquidation problem: They will 
not sell the most illiquid assets first. We test this prediction by focusing on the sales of securitized 
bonds and corporate bonds around the time of the onset of the crisis and relate them to the 
liquidity of the asset.  
As described in the Introduction, the crisis started in August 2007. Since our observations are 
quarterly, we examine changes between (i) the second quarter of 2007 ending in June and the 
third quarter of 2007 ending in September, and also between (ii) the second quarter of 2007 
ending in June and the fourth quarter of 2007 ending in December. Unreported statistics show 
that,  on  average,  securitized  bonds  were  not  sold  and  that  most  of  the  sales  took  place  in 
corporate bonds. The mutual funds reduced the holdings of corporate bonds in their portfolios by 
$253B (-15%) in the last quarter of 2007, while they reduced their holdings of securitized bonds 
by $82B (-9%). This is consistent with Hypothesis 1, namely, that securitized bonds were not 
prioritized for sale in the initial period of the crisis. During the same period, insurance companies 
are  small  net  purchasers,  increasing  their  holdings  of  corporate  bonds  by  $60B  (3%)  and 
securitized bonds by $10B  (1%). The contrast between mutual funds and insurance companies 
are  also  consistent  with  Hypothesis  2,  namely,  that  short-horizon  investors  liquidated  greater 
portions of their portfolios.    17 
Next we examine whether the net sales of corporate bonds and securitized bonds are related 
to the contemporaneous fund flows.
23 Unlike hedge funds and investment banks that were highly 
leveraged and were forced to de-leverage when the values of securitized bonds that they posted as 
collateral  plunged,  mutual  funds  are  generally  un-levered.  Thus,  the  posited  propagation  of 
shocks  from  securitized  bonds  to  corporate  bonds  via  the  joint  ownership  of  the  assets  (and 
liquidity-motivated trades) by mutual funds has to come from either contemporaneous or future 
expected  fund  flows.
24  Given  our  data  constraints,  we  examine  this  question  using 
contemporaneous flows only.
25 We predict that funds with the most negative flows are the main 
sellers  of  corporate  bonds,  and  that  their  sales  of  corporate  bonds  dominate  their  trades  of 
securitized bonds.  
The results are reported in Table III, Panel A. We use just the pure bond funds that held both 
corporate bonds and securitized bonds in their portfolios prior to the crisis and use their portfolio 
changes  in  the  last  two  quarters  of  2007  as  the  dependent  variable.  In  columns  (1)-(4)  the 
dependent variable is the percentage net purchases of corporate bonds (odd-numbered columns) 
and securitized bonds (even-numbered). In columns (5)-(8) the dependent variable is the Log-
$ Sales and columns are organized analogously. The cross section of sample funds are then sorted 
by  their  contemporaneous  fund  flows  into  four  bins.  In  columns  (1)-(2)  and  (5)-(6),  the  net 
position changes are regressed on just the four category dummies; in columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8), 
the  model  also  includes  additional  fund  characteristics,  such  as  Affiliated  with  bank  and 
Log(Family size). As expected, there is a monotonic relationship between the fund flows and net 
sales:  funds with the most negative flows have significantly more negative net position changes, 
and vice versa. Importantly, funds that experience the most negative flows significantly reduce 
corporate  bond  holdings  but  retain  securitized  bonds,  consistent  with  them  needing  to  meet 
liquidity needs and deciding to sell more liquid part of portfolios. The F-stat for the hypothesis 
that  the  funds  with  the  most  negative  flows  sold  significantly  more  corporate  funds  than 
securitized bonds is significant at the 5% level in three out of the four specifications. Interestingly, 
funds  affiliated  with  banks  also  reduce  corporate  bond  holdings  significantly  but  retain 
                                                 
23 We thank Ken French for suggesting this exercise.  
24 As discussed in Section 2, funds could decide to sell corporate bonds for allocation reasons even in the absence of 
contemporaneous outflows. Mutual funds seek to maintain relatively stable risk and style characteristics to satisfy their 
objectives.  The “shock” to the securitized bond market has left the funds with “toxic” holdings that are riskier and less 
liquid than they had anticipated. To reduce the risk level, so as to avoid future outflows, the funds with securitized bond 
holdings would liquidate (particularly low-grade) corporate bonds.   
25 Ideally, we would also like to run experiments where we would observe the impact on not re-balancing funds’ 
portfolios in response to the crisis shock on their future outflows. However, this is not observable for two reasons. First, 
in equilibrium rational fund managers would avoid such outcome by re-balancing their portfolios.  Second, we are 
limited by our data, which last only until the first quarter of 2008.   18 
securitized bonds. Overall, these preliminary results support the idea that the liquidity-motivated 
trades  by  funds  most  desperate  to  raise  cash  contributed  to  the  propagation  of  shocks  from 
securitized bonds to corporate bonds.   
To further investigate the determinants of corporate bond sales at the bond level, for a cross-
sectional sample of corporate bonds we estimate multivariate regressions of the following form:  
,   (2) 
where LogSalei is the log-net sales (in thousands of dollars) of corporate bond i by institutional 
investors between July 2007 and December 2007, LogHoldi denotes the log-dollar holding of 
corporate bond i by institutional investors as of June 2007, and x is a vector of standard bond 
characteristics,  which  are:  the  logarithm  of  the  amount  outstanding ( Bond  face  value),  the 
logarithm of the number of months to maturity (Log(Months to maturity)), an indicator variable 
for whether the bond has covenants (Covenants), a covenant protection index (CovIndex),
26 an 
indicator variable equal to 1 when the bond does not have a rating, 0 otherwise, an indicator 
variable equal to 1 when the bond is not held by institutional investors in our data set as of June 
2007, as well as bond issuer and issuance year fixed effects. Including issuer fixed-effects implies 
that we control for any unobserved firm characteristics that may affect the sales of all bonds 
issued by a given issuer.  
Quality denotes one of three proxies for the quality of the bond, which we include one at a 
time (in specifications (1) –(3)), as well as all three (in specification (4)). The first proxy is the 
InvRating, defined as: 
, 
where Rating is a numerical variable measuring the bond’s rating, ranging from 0 (no rating) to 
24 (AAA rating or above); the lower the rating, the higher the temporary price impact of trading, 
and the larger InvRating. The other two proxies are directly related to how thinly traded the bond 
is. They are constructed by using data on actual transactions from TRACE. The first is InvTrades, 
the natural logarithm of the inverse of the number of trades from TRACE. For each bond, we 
consider the mean number of trades per day between January 2007-June 2007; the more illiquid, 
the larger this variable. The second is the bond’s Amihud illiquidity ratio.
27 The Amihud ratio is 
                                                 
26 The construction of the covenant index follows Billet et al. (2007). 
27 Amihud (2002).   19 
defined as the average daily  , where   is the daily percentage change in price 
(“return”) and $V is the bond’s dollar volume of trade. This most directly measures the price 
impact of daily trading, as normalized by trade volume; again, the more illiquid the bond, the 
larger this variable. We compute the average ratio over the period January 2007-June 2007.  
The  results  are  reported  in  Table  III,  Panel  B.  They  show  that  the  sales  by  institutional 
investors are concentrated on bonds with lower ratings, as well as on the more liquid bonds. One 
standard  deviation  increase  (decrease)  in  the  bond’s  InvRating  (Amihud  ratio,  InvTrades)  is 
associated with a 22% (5%, 3%) higher selling pressure.  
These  findings  are  (at  least  partly)  consistent  with  both  the  Scholes  conjecture  and  the 
dynamic liquidation hypotheses.  The positive relationship of sales with liquidity is consistent 
with the Scholes conjecture as well as with the dynamic liquidation hypotheses á la Brown et al. 
(2009).  In contrast, the negative relationship of sales with ratings is consistent with the dynamic 
liquidation hypothesis and is inconsistent with the Scholes conjecture.  
  
5.2 Selling and Investment Horizon after the onset of the crisis 
We now link sales to the horizon of the investors and test whether investors with shorter horizon 
liquidate more in the initial phase of the crisis (Hypothesis 2) and also whether they sell lower-
rated bonds more (Hypothesis 2b). We therefore relate the changes in holdings of mutual fund 
investors around the onset of the crisis to their investment horizon. For Hypothesis 2, we estimate 
for a sample of mutual funds: 
  ,  (3) 
where   is the change, between 2007Q2 and 2007Q4, in the fraction of the fund’s portfolio 
represented by either securitized bonds or corporate bonds. Horizon is our proxy for the fund 
horizon – Turnover ratio or Flow volatility
28 – while x is a set of fund characteristics including 
the control variables from Equation (1), as well as the fraction of securitized (or corporate) bonds 
in the fund’s portfolio as of 2007Q2. Both Horizon and x are expressed in values as of June 2007 
in column (1)-(4). As described earlier, there were some signs of disruptions in the subprime-
                                                 
28 Our results reported in Tables IV-VI are robust to using the flow performance sensitivity as a third proxy of horizon. 
We are however concerned with two potential issues. First, the extreme performance may be more likely for equity 
than bonds, and more likely for lower grade corporate bonds than AAA-rated securitized bonds. Second, the sensitivity 
could also capture how well fund manager incentives are aligned with fund investors. These concerns make clean 
interpretations of results using the sensitivity proxy difficult. Thus we rely instead on the turnover and flow volatility 
proxies for our inferences. The results are available from the authors upon request.   20 
mortgage markets as early as 2007Q1; hence it is possible that funds that held more securitized 
bonds experienced disruptions in their performance and flows in the first two quarters of 2007. 
Thus,  to  ensure  that  our  measures  of  fund  investment  horizon  are  not  driven  by  these  early 
episodes  of  the  crisis, we  repeat  our  analysis  using  horizon  measures  as  of  December  2006, 
instead of June 2007, and report the results in columns (5)-(8).
29  
The results are reported in Table IV, Panel A. In columns (1)-(2), the dependent variable is 
the fraction of the fund’s portfolio represented by securitized bonds, while in columns (3)-(4), the 
dependent variable is the fraction of the fund’s portfolio represented by corporate bonds. The 
results  show  a  significantly  negative (positive)  correlation  between  the  horizon length  of  the 
investor and the net change in the representation of securitized bonds (corporate bonds) in the 
portfolio; that is, the shorter the horizon, the more the institutional investor reduces his stake in 
corporate bonds. In terms of magnitude, one standard deviation increase in the Turnover ratio 
(Flow volatility) is related to a 6% (2%) higher reduction in corporate bond holdings. Funds that 
are  affiliated  with  commercial  banks  or  are  part  of  big  financial  groups  tend  to  sell  more 
corporate bonds and to retain securitized bonds.  
We  further  examine  whether  the  short-horizon  investors  sell  low  quality  bonds  more  by 
examining  their  sales  of  corporate  bonds  separately  for  investment-grade  and  subinvestment- 
grade corporate bonds (Hypothesis 3). We repeat the specification presented in Equation (3) and 
simply replace the dependent variable with ΔC, the changes in portfolio representations of (i) 
investment-grade corporate bonds and (ii) sub-investment grade corporate bonds.  
The results are reported in Table IV, Panel B. In the odd-numbered columns, the dependent 
variable ΔC is the fund’s excess sales of investment grade bonds, as a fraction of the value of the 
fund’s portfolio as of June 2007. In the even-numbered columns, the dependent variable is the 
fund’s  sales  of  junk  bonds.  The  estimates  are  broadly  supportive  of  the  dynamic  liquidation 
hypothesis in that the propensity to liquidate is more sensitive to the investment horizons of the 
investors for low-rated bonds. The impact of investor horizon on the sales of corporate bonds is 
concentrated  among  the  below-investment-grade  bonds.  A  one  standard  deviation  increase  in 
Turnover ratio (Flow volatility) tends to increase the sale of junk bonds by 6% (6%), whereas it 
has a significantly smaller impact on the sales of investment grade bonds (F-stat p-values for the 
statistical significance of the two coefficients are provided at the bottom of the table). Note also 
                                                 
29 We thank Kent Daniel for suggesting this exercise.  In unreported analysis, we also re-estimate the models reported 
in  Tables  V-VI  (Panel  B)  and  VIII  using  horizon  measures  as  of  December  2006  and  find  that  the  results  are 
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that R-squared is three to five times larger for the junk bonds (even-numbered columns) than for 
investment-grade bonds (odd-numbered columns).  
Overall, the results in Tables II and IV show that (i) short-horizon mutual funds loaded up on 
securitized bonds and ended up with a higher exposure to them by the onset of the crisis, and (ii) 
when the crisis hit in August 2007 and securitized bonds became illiquid, they liquidated more 
than longer-horizon investors in the first months of the crisis, and, in particular, they reduced their 
holdings of lower-rated corporate bonds. The result on lower-rated corporate bonds being sold 
more  is  consistent  with  the  predictions  of  the  dynamic  liquidation  model,  where  vulnerable 
investors optimize over multiple periods and as a result may retain relatively liquid assets when 
faced with sufficiently large expected future shocks. Alternatively, investors with exposure to 
securitized bonds may have perceived securitized bonds to have become permanently riskier, and 
wished to reduce the elevated risk of their portfolios by selling riskier corporate bonds.  
As reported earlier, we find that the insurance companies overall were small net purchasers of 
both asset classes at the onset of the crisis. The only exception is a small subset of insurance 
companies whose risk-based capital ratios (RBC ratio) were below the threshold level of 2 as of 
2007Q2 — these insurance companies sold securitized bonds.
30 Given that downgrades did not 
occur for most of these bonds until after our sample period, this behavior is consistent with the 
view that insurance companies’ portfolio decisions are based on capital regulation constraints.  
6.  Effects  of  Investors’  Exposure  to  Securitized  Bonds  on 
Corporate Bonds 
The previous sections show that, as the crisis hits the market, institutional investors with a short 
investment horizon retain their (now) most illiquid assets – the securitized bonds – and sell the 
others. In particular, they prioritize the sale of junk bonds. We now examine whether corporate 
bonds that are held by investors with heavy exposure to securitized bonds experience negative 
shocks at the onset of the crisis. We start by focusing on changes in corporate bond yield spreads 
(prices) and trading volumes (Hypothesis 3). We then test whether the size of the impact is 
related to the bond rating (Hypothesis 3b). Finally, we examine whether insurance companies act 
as strategic liquidity providers to offset the sales by short-horizon mutual funds. 
6.1 Effects on Corporate Bond Yields 
For a cross-sectional sample of corporate bonds, we estimate the following model:  
                                                 
30 The NAIC states that insurance companies with an RBC ratio below 2 are subject to supervision by state regulators.    22 
   (4), 
where each observation corresponds to a corporate bond with data in the FINRA TRACE data set. 
The dependent variable   is the change in corporate bond i’s yield spread around the time of 
the  onset  of  the  crisis.  The  yield  spread  is  the  difference  between  the  bond’s  yield  in  the 
secondary  market,  as  reported  by  TRACE,  and  the  yield  of  a  Treasury  bond  of  comparable 
maturity.
31 Data on Treasury bond yields are from the Federal Reserve Statistical Release.  
We  empirically  gauge  the  magnitude  of  potential  future  shocks  by  creating  an  exposure 
measure at the individual bond level (HoldersExposurei). This measure is constructed by first 
calculating the exposure of the portfolio of each institutional investor to the securitized bonds at 
the individual mutual fund level, and then weight-averaging this exposure across all the funds 
holding a particular corporate bond i.
32 The larger the exposure of the mutual fund investors 
holding bond i, the more bond i is expected to be sold today.   
What  about  insurance  company  investors?  We  expect  the  mechanism  governing  their 
portfolio decisions to be distinct.  As we argued, they are not subject to runs like mutual funds, 
because they have longer lock-up periods and heftier early withdrawal penalties. This makes them 
less subject to selling pressure in the initial period of the crisis.  At the same time, they are subject 
to rating-based capital regulation. Downgrades of securitized bonds would thus predict sales by 
insurance companies. However, in the second half of 2007 — the focus of our analysis — there 
were only a very small number of downgrades of securitized bonds.  Thus, we do not expect 
insurance companies to liquidate as much as mutual funds during this period.  To verify this 
prediction, we also construct an analogous HoldersExposure measure for insurance companies 
and include this variable in one of the specifications.  
The dynamic liquidation model predicts that, for a sufficiently large expected future liquidity 
shock,  investors  optimizing  over  multiple  periods  may  choose  to  liquidate  assets  that  have 
relatively high temporary price impacts in the initial period (e.g., junk bonds) and to retain assets 
with low temporary price impacts (e.g., investment-grade bonds) to hedge against future shocks. 
We thus interact the exposure measure (HoldersExposurei) with InvRatingi (as defined before) 
and include this interaction term as well as InvRatingi itself in the model.  The lower the rating, 
                                                 
31 For related literature on determinants of credit spreads and fixed-income returns, see Litterman and Scheinkman 
(1991), Knez et al. (1994), Colin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Chen et al. (2008), and Gutierrez et al. (2010). 
32 In the results reported in Tables V-VII, the exposure measures are as of June 2007.  In unreported analyses, we re-
estimate  the  models  in  Tables  V-VII  with  exposure  measures  as  of  December  2006  and  find  that  the  results  are 
qualitatively unchanged.  
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the higher the InvRatingi is, and the more the bond is expected to be sold as a function of the 
bondholders’ exposure to securitized bonds.   
We also include a standard set of bond characteristics x, which includes the level of the yield 
spread of bond i as of June 2007, the bond’s liquidity measures (Amihud ratio or InvTrades, as 
defined before), an interaction term between HoldersExposure and bond liquidity, as well as 
issuer  and  issuance  year  fixed  effects.  In  all  specifications,  the  standard  errors  are  clustered 
around bond issuers.  
There may be concerns that the inclusion of a given corporate bond in a portfolio of high-
exposure investors is endogenous. The inclusion of a bond issuer dummy 
€ 
µ j (firm fixed effect) 
allows us to mitigate these concerns. Effectively, the use of a firm fixed-effect model enables us 
to compare the yield spread change of a bond held by exposed investors to another bond issued by 
the  same  firm  (firm  j)  but  held  by  non-exposed  investors,  holding  any  issuer-specific 
characteristics  (both  observable  traits,  such  as  credit  ratings,  as  well  as  unobservable, 
idiosyncratic traits) constant.  
Further, since we construct the dependent variable, yield spread, as the yield of the bond in 
excess of the Treasury bond of the same term structure, we are also able to control for any term 
spread difference that might be present between the exposed and non-exposed bonds of a given 
issuer. That is, we are able to isolate the variations in spread changes and selling pressures across 
bonds (holding issuer risk and term structure constant) as functions of bond-specific exposure 
measures.  
We report the results in Table V. In columns (1)-(4)  is defined as the change in the 
bond’s yield spread over the period from the last week of June through the last week of October 
2007, while in columns (5)-(8) it is the change in the bond’s yield spread over the period from the 
last week of June through the last week of December 2007. The sample includes all bonds in the 
FINRA TRACE data set with available data on bond characteristics from the Mergent FISD data.  
The  first  coefficient,  HoldersExposure,  is  positive  and  significant,  which  means  that  the 
higher the exposure of the investors holding bond i, the more the yield spread goes up in the 
months after the onset of the crisis. Comparing the coefficients on HoldersExposure between the 
left- and the right-hand side panel, we also note that they are two to three times larger in the right-
hand side panel, which is consistent with the worsening effect of investors’ exposure on yields 
over time. The results are consistent with Hypothesis (3). An increase in HoldersExposure from 
0% to 50% is associated with a 70 bps higher increase in the yield spread in the first two quarters   24 
of  the  crisis.  Recall  (Table  I)  that  corporate  bond  yield  spreads  increased  by  approximately 
100bps on average in the first quarter of the crisis, and about 200 bps in the first two quarters of 
the crisis.  This suggests that our findings are large but reasonable.   
The third coefficient, the interaction term of HoldersExposure and InvRating, is also positive 
and significant. This implies that the lower the rating of the bond, the more its yield increased as a 
function of its holders’ exposure to securitized bonds. The result is consistent with Hypothesis 
(3b) and suggests that the sharp increase in yield spreads of lower-rated bonds at the start of the 
crisis, as depicted in Figure 1, is at least partly due to the contagion of the shock from the (mostly 
AAA-rated)  securitized  bond  market  to  the  lower-rated  corporate  bond  market  via  the  joint 
ownership of both securities by mutual funds.  
We separately control for the effect of a rating itself on the yield spread change by including 
InvRating itself in the model (second row). The positive and significant coefficient suggests that 
the lower the rating of the bond, the more the bond yield increased during this period independent 
of the investors’ exposure to securitized bonds. This may be due to overall increased fear of risk 
or  investor  panic  that  is  unrelated  to  the  transmission  mechanism  we  examine  here.  The 
interaction term between HoldersExposure and the bond’s overall liquidity measures (Amihud 
ratio, InvTrades), on the other hand, is generally insignificant. 
We also augment specification (4) by adding the fraction of securitized bonds held by the 
insurance companies and the corresponding interaction term with the ratings. Neither coefficient 
is significant (though positive). This is in line with our expectations, since insurance companies 
are not expected to be under pressure in the initial period of the crisis when bond ratings are still 
largely intact.  
Overall,  these  results  show  that  there  is  an  incremental  effect  that  comes  from  the 
transmission  channel  that  we  identify  over  and  above  the  general  unconditional  increase  in 
corporate bond yields during this period. The increase in bond yield spreads around the 2007 
crisis is most pronounced among the low-rated bonds held by mutual funds with heavy exposure 
to securitized bonds.  
As a robustness check, in Panel B, we estimate an alternative model specification:  
(5), 
where ShortExposedi is an indicator equal to 1 if bond i’s short-horizon mutual fund holder’s 
exposure to securitized bonds is above the sample median. The idea is to isolate the effect on 
short-horizon investors’ exposure (to securitized bonds) on yield spread changes, rather than the 
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average holder’s exposure.  We use two proxies of investor horizon, and examine the model using 
both the change in yield spread between July and October 2007 (columns (1)-(2)), as well as 
between July and December 2007 (columns (3)-(4)). Positive coefficients on ShortExposedi itself 
as well as positive coefficients on its interaction term with InvRatingi indicate that presence of 
high exposure for these investors with liquidity needs is associated with greater yield spread 
changes, and this is especially so for lower-rated bonds.   
In Figure 2, we provide an illustration of the econometric results presented in Table V. We 
plot the cumulative monthly return on a portfolio that is short on corporate bonds whose mutual 
fund holders have “high exposure” to securitized bonds, and long on a set of issuer- and duration-
matched bonds without the exposure. We place a “high exposure” bond in the short portfolio if 
and only if it has a matching bond without a high exposure satisfying the following criteria: (i) 
the matching bond is issued by the same issuer firm; and (ii) the time to maturity of the matching 
bond is between 50% and 150% of the time to maturity of the shorted bond. These matched bonds 
are then placed in the long portfolio. We then construct the return of a portfolio based on the 
difference between long portfolio’s monthly return minus the short portfolio’s monthly return.  
The cumulative return on the long-short portfolio hovers around zero from 2004 to 2006, but 
rises sharply in 2007. Given that the return on this portfolio is, by construction, independent of 
changes in firm-specific risk, we can interpret this sharp rise as due to selling pressure on the 
exposed bonds by their investors.
33  While this plot is for illustrative purposes only, the issuer 
fixed effect models presented in Tables V-VII allow us to draw inferences about the statistical 
significance of this effect.    
 6.2 Effects on Corporate Bond Trades 
While the positive relationship between investors’ exposure to securitized bonds and an increase 
in the yield is consistent with selling pressure being exerted on the bond by mutual funds in need 
of liquidation, we have so far not directly studied whether individual bond sales by mutual funds 
are  a  direct  function  of  their  exposure.  Therefore,  we  now  focus  on  whether  mutual  funds’ 
relative trading impact increased after the onset of the crisis and whether this increase is related to 
the fraction of securitized bonds they held. We estimate 
, (6) 
                                                 
33 There may be concerns that the term spread differences between the exposed bond and the matched bond may drive 
some of these results. In the results reported here, the exposed bonds have on average slightly longer duration (about 
8.75 years) than the matched bonds (8.13 years) by the same issuers. To address these concerns, we repeated the 
exercise with a restricted sample where the matched bonds had longer duration than the exposed bonds, and the results 
were qualitatively unchanged.    
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where the dependent variable is defined as: 
 
 
for corporate bond i, over the periods July-October 2007 and July-December 2007. This variable 
proxies the weight of the mutual funds’ sales out of all the trades for bond i. We hypothesize that 
the selling pressure from mutual funds on a bond is higher the more the funds are exposed to 
securitized bonds and the lower the bond rating is. The other variables are defined as in the 
previous specification.  
The  results  are  reported  in  Table  VI.  The  interaction  term  coefficient  is  positive  and 
significant.  Thus, the lower the rating of bond i and the higher the exposure of its investors to 
securitized bonds, the higher the mutual funds sales as a percentage of the total trading volume 
for  the  bond  in  the  initial  months  of  the  crisis.  A  one  standard  deviation  increase  in 
HoldersExposure is associated with a 26% higher increase in mutual funds’ selling pressure for a 
junk bond  (rated BBB- or below) than for a AAA-rated bond.  
In Panel B, we estimate an alternative model specification based on the following:  
 
(7) . 
This specification is analogous to Equation (5) in Table V, Panel B.  
We find a positive relationship between trading volume and both ShortExposed itself as well as 
its interaction with InvRating. This indicates that the presence of high exposure for the investors 
with liquidity needs is associated with more selling pressure, and especially for lower-rated bonds. 
Finally, as a robustness check, we re-estimate specification (6) using as a dependent variable 
LogVol, defined as: LogVol = log(1 + Vol) where Vol is the bond’s average daily trading volume, 
expressed  in  thousands  of  trades.  This  variable  proxies  for  the  overall  trade  in  the  market. 
HoldersExposure and InvRating are defined as above, and x is a set of standard control variables, 
including the average weekly log-trading volume as of June 2007, as well as issuer and issuance 
year fixed effects.  
The results are reported in Table VII. The first row coefficient, HoldersExposure, is positive 
and  significant,  implying  that  the  higher  the  bondholders’  exposure  to  securitized  bonds,  the 
higher the trading volume of corporate bond i. The second row coefficient, InvRating, is negative 
and significant, implying that unconditionally lower-rated bonds are traded less and thus more 
€ 
ΔTri =α + βShortExposedi + γInvRatingi +δ(ShortExposedi × InvRatingi)+ϕ'xi + µ j +εi  27 
illiquid.  This finding validates our use of a bond’s rating as a measure of a temporary price 
impact of trading. More importantly, the third coefficient, the interaction between the first two, is 
positive and significant. This implies that, even though lower-rated bonds traded less in the initial 
months of the crisis in general, among those held by investors with exposure to securitized bonds, 
higher exposure and lower bond rating were directly related to more trades. This is consistent 
with Hypothesis (3b). That is, when faced with large uncertainty about recurring future liquidity 
shocks  (as  measured  by  exposure  to  securitized  bonds),  investors  chose  to  sell  lower-rated 
corporate  bonds  and  to  retain  higher-rated  corporate  bonds  as  a  hedge  against  future  forced 
liquidations.  
This provides the final link between securitized bond holdings, investor sales, and corporate 
bond yields. It shows that the corporate bonds that experience increases in yields due to high 
exposure of their holders to securitized bonds are also the ones that display spikes in trading 
volumes and increases in representations of mutual fund trades among overall trades during the 
initial months of the crisis.  Overall, these results suggest that funds significantly increase their 
price pressure on corporate bonds during the crisis and that this impact is positively related to 
their exposure to securitized bonds.  
6.3 Are Insurance Companies Strategic Liquidity Providers?  
In the previous sections, we find that insurance companies traded relatively little and in fact were 
small net purchases of both corporate bonds and securitized bonds at the onset of the crisis. 
Magnitudes of their trades are small compared to those of mutual funds, which suggest they did 
not fully offset the mutual funds’ liquidity demand.  Moreover, unlike mutual fund holders whose 
exposure to securitized bonds affected increases in bond yield spreads, insurance companies’ 
exposure to securitized bonds had no significant impact on the yields of corporate bonds they 
held.  Similarly, their exposure did not impact how much mutual funds holders contributed to the 
selling pressure on a given bond.  At the same time, we find, in Table VII, that the effect of 
insurance companies’ exposure on the overall trades of a bond was significantly positive in the 
period including the last quarter of 2007.  
In this subsection we provide additional analysis on whether insurance companies acted as 
strategic liquidity providers to offset the sales of corporate bonds by mutual funds.
34  Our analysis 
                                                 
34 We acknowledge that our analysis is limited by the fact that we do not observe holdings by other classes of investors, 
such as hedge funds, banks, governments, and foreign investors. Clearly, it is important to understand who besides 
insurance companies acted as liquidity providers in various asset class markets during this time of the crisis. For 
example, He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) argue that banks were liquidity providers in the securitized bond 
market.     28 
consists of comparisons of insurance companies’ behavior in pre-crisis and crisis periods, such as 
correlation of their trades with mutual funds’ and price impact of their trades and mutual funds’ 
trades on bond yield spreads.   
First, we examine the extent to which mutual funds’ net trades of individual corporate bonds 
are (positively or negatively) correlated with insurance companies’ net trades of the same bonds.  
The model we estimate and report in Table VIII, Panel A is as follows:  
 (8) , 
where MF_Netbuyit and INS_Netbuyit are mutual funds’ and insurance companies’ net purchases 
of corporate bond i at t, respectively.  Column (1) in Panel A reports the results for all the mutual 
funds, while columns (2)-(3) and (4)-(5) report the results for short-horizon funds and non-short-
horizon  funds,  respectively.  Positive  and  significant  coefficients  for  β1  and  β2  imply  that 
insurance companies’ trades and mutual funds’ trades are positively correlated both in the pre-
crisis and crisis periods. The large F-stat values for H0: β1 = β2 show that the positive correlation 
between the trades became significantly stronger, not weaker, during the crisis months.  
In Panel B, we compare for a cross-section sample of corporate bonds the correlation of 
mutual funds’ trades with insurance companies’ trades in the crisis periods for low-flow funds 
and high-flow funds, respectively. While they are both positively correlated, trades of low-flow 
funds are significantly less correlated with the insurance companies’ trades, suggesting that their 
trades offset each other to a greater degree than trades of high-flow funds and those of insurance 
companies.  
Next, we break down the institutional trades into mutual fund trades and insurance company 
trades to see if there was a structural break in the relationship between the trades and the bond 
yields at the onset of the crisis. The results are reported in Table IX.  This analysis provides 
several interesting findings. First, we document in column (2) that mutual funds are larger net 
sellers of corporate bonds in the crisis period than in the pre-crisis period. In contrast, insurance 
companies’ net sales are significantly smaller as a percentage of their total holdings during the 
crisis period than in the pre-crisis period (column (1)). This suggests that, at least to a degree, 
insurance companies’ trades mitigate the overall fluctuations in trades caused by mutual funds. In 
column (3), we show that the relation between the institutional investors’ (i.e., mutual funds and 
insurance companies combined) net trades and bond yield spread changes was positive in the pre-
crisis periods, whereas it turns negative, i.e., net sales are associated with yield increases, in the 
crisis periods. In column (4), we break down the institutional investors’ net trades into mutual   29 
funds’  and  insurance  companies’  trades,  and  show  that  this  structural  break  in  the  relation 
between trades and yield changes is driven by mutual funds rather than insurance companies.  
Further, in column (5), we examine the net purchases by funds that experience more negative 
flows (below median).  We find that their trades is significantly correlated with bond yield spread 
changes with a negative sign in the crisis-periods, and that the coefficient is significantly larger 
than for mutual funds overall (p-value = 0.0131). 
Our interpretation of the results is as follows: Mutual funds were strategic liquidity providers 
for corporate bonds they held during the pre-crisis period, buying when yield for the bond was 
going up (when price was low).  As the crisis hit, mutual funds became liquidity demanders, 
effectively selling when the price was low; this is especially true for funds with negative flows. In 
contrast, insurance companies never acted strategically.  We think that this is perhaps because 
their flows are steady and they do not have much room to act strategically. Also, their capital 
regulation  might  have  curtailed  their  economic  incentives  to  hold  (especially)  lower-rated 
corporate bonds. 
Overall, these findings suggest that insurance companies did not act as strategic liquidity 
providers at the onset of the crisis and that at best there is only weak evidence that their trades 
partially offset the net sales of corporate bonds by mutual funds.  
Conclusion 
We study a transmission mechanism that explains the contagion of the crisis from the securitized 
bond market to the corporate bond market. We posit that, ceteris paribus, corporate bonds held by 
“intoxicated” investors with high exposure to securitized bonds and liquidity needs experience 
greater selling pressure and price declines (yield increases) at the onset of the crisis. We further 
test predictions of the theory of dynamic asset liquidation: Investors with large enough future 
liquidity shocks retain the most liquid assets, and instead sell assets that have a relatively high 
(temporary) price impact of trading.  
The results confirm our predictions about the transmission mechanism and the determinants 
of investors’ portfolio decisions. We show that, prior to the onset of the crisis, mutual fund 
investors  were  eager  participants  in  the  securitized  bond  market,  especially  in  the  top-rating 
category.  This  was  “rational”  in  the  pre-crisis  world  when  these  securitized  bonds  were 
considered to be safe, liquid and informationally insensitive, relative to corporate bonds with 
higher idiosyncratic risk and, therefore, a need for more intensive credit research. Consistent with 
the view that investors were hungry for relatively attractive yields in the low-interest environment,   30 
funds  with  high  flow-performance  sensitivity  held  higher  portions  of  their  portfolios  in 
securitized bonds. Funds that are affiliated with commercial banks also held higher portions of 
their portfolios in securitized bonds.  
When  securitized  bonds  abruptly  became  illiquid  and  their  resale  values  plunged,  the 
institutional investors with significant exposure to securitized bonds – i.e., mutual funds with 
short  investment  horizons  and  insurance  firms  with  regulatory  capital  constraints  –  faced  a 
portfolio rebalancing problem. The mutual funds did not rush to sell the now impaired and hard-
to-value securitized bonds en masse, and instead sharply reduced holdings of corporate bonds, 
while the insurance companies sold neither class of assets (except those with a below-threshold 
level  of  risk-based  capital,  which  reduced  holdings  of  securitized  bonds).  The  mutual  funds’ 
portfolio  decisions  induced  a  transmission  of  shocks  from  the  securitization  market  to  the 
corporate bond market. Most importantly, sales rose and yield spreads widened more for bonds 
held  by  exposed  mutual  fund  investors,  compared  to  same-issuer  bonds  held  by  unexposed 
investors. Our findings show that short-horizon investors with high exposure to securitized bonds 
have played a significant role in spreading the crisis from the securitized bond market to the 
seemingly unrelated corporate bond market. The incentives and contract features significantly 
affect the behavior of institutional investors, as indicated by the impact of investment horizon, as 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
I. Mutual Fund Characteristics 
 
 Holdings of corporate bonds and securitized bonds in the mutual fund’s portfolio, 
and  changes  thereof  after  the  onset  of  the  crisis.  H  is  defined  as  the  percentage  of 
corporate bonds (respectively securitized bonds) in the mutual fund’s portfolio, in excess 
of the average percentage holdings of corporate bonds (respectively securitized bonds) 
among the funds in the same sector as the fund. We define sectors based on the maturity 
and rating of the securities held in the funds’ portfolios by crossing three maturity terciles 
and three rating terciles, obtaining nine sectors.   is the change in H between June 
2007 and December 2007. C is the percentage of investment grade (resp. sub-investment 
grade) corporate bonds in the mutual fund’s portfolio, defined analogously.   is the 
change in C between June 2007 and December 2007. 
 
Flow volatility   Standard deviation of the mutual fund’s monthly flows, computed over a rolling 
window of length 12 months. 
 
Turnover  ratio  Turnover  ratio  of  the  mutual  fund’s  portfolio,  defined  as  the  minimum  (of 
aggregated sales or aggregated purchases of securities) divided by the average 12-month 
total net assets of the fund. 
 
Flow-performance sensitivity  Sensitivity of the investment flow into the mutual fund to the 
fund’s past performance. Define the net flow into the mutual fund in a given month as:  
 
where TNA is the fund’s total net asset value, and R is the fund’s return. We sort funds 
into 3x3 = 9 styles, based on maturity and ratings of bonds held. Every month, the fund’s 
style-adjusted return is calculated as the fund’s return minus the average style return. We 
measure the fund i’s percentile rank of its cumulative style-adjusted return in January to 
June of a given year (Performance(Jan-June)it) and the cumulative flow into the fund in 
July  to  December  of  the  same  year  (Flow(July-Dec)it),  so  as  to  avoid  the  overlap  in 
measurement periods. Finally, the following regression is estimated separately for each 
fund i over the period 1998-2006:  
 
The fund i’s flow-performance sensitivity is the estimate  .  
Log(Family size) Natural logarithm of the total net assets under management of the fund’s mutual 
fund family, expressed in thousands of dollars. 
Affiliated with commercial bank Indicator variable equal to one if the mutual fund belongs to a 
fund family that is affiliated with a commercial bank (following Massa and Rehman 
(2008)).  
Past flow      Investment flow into the mutual fund over the previous quarter. 
Fund return  Quarterly return of the mutual fund. 
Family equity holdings Equity holdings by the fund’s fund family as a fraction of total holdings.   34 
Mgmt fee Management fees of the mutual fund, as a fraction of its average net assets, obtained 
from the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free Mutual Fund Database.  
Expense Ratio Fund’s expense ratio in the most recent fiscal year, defined as the total investment 
that the shareholders pay for the fund’s operating expenses (including12b1 fees). 
Actual 12b1 Ratio of total assets of the fund attributed to marketing and distribution costs, as 
reported in the Annual Report Statement of Operations.  
Average maturity of the holdings Natural logarithm of the average maturity of the fixed income 
holdings of the mutual fund, expressed in quarters. 
No  equity  (N/Y)  Indicator  variable  equal  to  one  if  the  fund  does  not  hold  any  equity,  zero 
otherwise. 
Fund’s equity holdings return Quarterly return on the equity holdings of the mutual fund.  
 
II. Bond characteristics 
LogSale (Jul-Oct 2007/Jul-Dec 2007) Natural logarithm of the net sales (in $K) of the bond by 
institutional investors over the periods July to October 2007 or July to December 2007. 
∆YS (Jul-Oct 2007/Jul-Dec 2007) Change in the bond’s yield spread (defined as the spread 
between the bond’s yield and the yield of a government bond of comparable maturity) 
over the periods July to October 2007 or July to December 2007.  
∆Tr (Jul-Oct 2007/Jul-Dec 2007) Net sales of the bond by mutual funds as a fraction of the 
bond’s total trading volume, over the specified periods (July-Oct 2007/July-Dec 2007). 
Holders’ Exposure Holdings of securitized bonds as a fraction of the portfolio of the average 
mutual fund holding the bond. For each bond, we compute the fraction of securitized 
bonds in the portfolio of each mutual fund that holds the bond. We then weight average 
across mutual funds, with weights proportional to the par amount held by each fund. 
Insurance  Holders’  Exposure  Average  holdings  of  securitized  bonds  as  a  fraction  of  the 
portfolio of the average insurance company holding the bond.  
No rating (Y/N) Indicator variable equal to one if the bond does not have a rating, zero otherwise. 
InvRating An inverse measure of the quality of the bond’s rating, as defined in the text.  
 
Bond face value Natural logarithm of the total amount outstanding of the bond at the issuance 
date, expressed in thousands of dollars. 
 
Covenants (Y/N) Indicator variable equal to one if there are covenants attached to the bond, and 
zero otherwise. Data on covenants are obtained from the Mergent Fixed Income database. 
 
CovIndex  Billet  et  al.  (2007)  index  of  covenant  protection  ranging  from  zero  (no  covenant 
protection) to one (complete covenant protection).  
 
Log(Months to maturity) Natural logarithm of the bond’s time to maturity, expressed in months.  
 
Amihud Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity proxy, as defined in the text. 
InvTrades The natural logarithm of the inverse of the number of trades on the bond, as reported 
from FINRA’s TRACE data set.   35 
Table I Summary Statistics 
The table reports the summary statistics. Panel A reports the securitized bond and corporate bond holdings by mutual funds and 
insurance companies. Panel B reports the corporate bond and securitized bond holdings of mutual funds by ratings (for bonds 
with known ratings only). Panel C reports AAA-rated bond holdings as % of the total portfolio. Panels D reports the breakdown 
of securitized bond holdings by collateral type (residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), commercial mortgage-backed 
securities (CMBS), other asset-backed securities (ABS), and government agency-backed securities (Agency). Panel E reports 
the summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis.  
 
A. Corporate bond and securitized bond holdings of mutual funds and insurance companies  
 
A-1: Mutual Funds ($bn)           A-2: Insurance Companies ($bn) 
   
 
B. Corporate bond and securitized bond holdings of mutual funds, by ratings  
B-1: Securitized Bonds (%)        B-2: Corporate Bonds %) 
   
 
C: AAA-rated bonds as % of total  
C-1: Mutual fund portfolio        C-2: Insurance company portfolio   36 
Table I Summary Statistics – cont’d 
 
D. Securitized bond holdings, by underlying asset type and ratings 
D-1: Mutual fund portfolio – all ratings      D-2: Mutual fund portfolio – AAA-rated only 
  
 
D-3: Insurance company portfolio – all ratings    D-4: Insurance company portfolio – AAA-rated only 
   37 
Table I Summary Statistics – cont’d 
 
E. Variables Used in the Analysis 
 
   Mean  Median  St. Dev.  Min  Max  N. Obs 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
E-1:  Variables used in Tables II and IV                   
             
Excess fractional holdings of corporate bonds   0.0346  0.0000  0.2809  -0.8644  0.9861  16252 
Excess fractional holdings of securitized assets  0.0154  0.0000  0.2216  -0.6464  0.8956  16252 
Turnover ratio (as fraction of TNA)   0.0135  0.0088  0.0137  0.0000  0.0980  16252 
Flow-performance sensitivity   0.2407  0.0874  0.4779  0.0000  8.5579  15835 
Flow volatility (over 12 monthly flows)  0.0549  0.0303  0.0658  0.0031  0.3987  15400 
Log(Family Size) (Size in $M)  3.0722  3.0809  1.8474  0.0000  7.2332  16252 
Affiliated with commercial bank [1=YES]  0.2877  0.0000  0.4527  0.0000  1.0000  16252 
Past flow   0.0202  -0.0009  0.1187  -0.2176  1.9452  16252 
Fund return   0.0136  0.0114  0.0432  -0.3982  0.7702  16252 
Family fractional equity holdings  0.1582  0.0000  0.2720  0.0000  0.9837  16252 
Mgmt fee (%)   0.4956  0.5030  0.2465  0.0000  2.2210  16252 
Exp. Ratio   0.0105  0.0093  0.0066  0.0000  0.1877  16252 
Actual 12b1   0.0025  0.0000  0.0036  0.0000  0.0103  16252 
Average maturity of holdings (months)  42.004  36.797  20.769  0.0007  196.00  16252 
No equity [1 = NO]  0.8166  1.0000  0.3869  0.0000  1.0000  16252 
Fund’s equity holdings return   0.0114  0.0000  0.1050  -0.8961  2.0006  16252 
E-2: Variables used in Tables III and V-VII                
             
LogSale (Jul-Oct 2007) (Sale in $K)  3.3864  0.0000  4.3138  0.0000  13.541  8148 
LogSale (Jul-Dec 2007) (Sale in $K)  4.2004  0.0000  4.7330  0.0000  13.893  8148 
∆YS (Jul-Oct 2007) (%)  0.8151  0.5376  1.2439  0.0495  13.191  7348 
∆YS (Jul-Dec 2007) (%)  1.9650  1.2949  2.0580  0.3239  19.965  8148 
∆Tr (Jul-Oct 2007)   0.0291  0.0000  0.2370  -0.0962  0.5646  8666 
∆Tr (Jul-Dec 2007)  0.0353  0.0000  0.0846  0.0000  0.4997  8728 
Holders’ Exposure (between 0 and 1)  0.0944  0.0000  0.1472  0.0000  0.9050  9598 
High-Turnover holders [1=YES]  0.3113  0.0000  0.4631  0.0000  1.0000  8728 
High-Flow volatility holders [1=YES]  0.3291  0.0000  0.4699  0.0000  1.0000  8728 
InvRating   -2.6509  -3.0445  1.0272  -3.3322  0.0000  9598 
Yield spread in 2007Q2 (%)   1.3392  1.1010  1.4089  0.3530  9.4245  9598 
No Rating [1 = NO]  0.1267  0.0000  0.3327  0.0000  1.0000  9598 
Bond face value (Log($K))  11.275  12.067  2.0613  7.0553  15.425  9598 
Covenants [1=YES]  0.4974  0.0000  0.5000  0.0000  1.0000  9598 
CovIndex (between 0 and 1)  0.1673  0.0000  0.2004  0.0000  0.6667  9598 
Log(Months to maturity)   4.1110  4.2627  1.1467  0.0000  6.9903  9598 
Insurance Co.’s Exposure (between 0 and 1)  0.2182  0.2761  0.1751  0.0000  0.9716  9598 
Bond is not held by mutual funds [1 = NO]  0.4359  0.0000  0.4959  0.0000  1.0000  9598 
Amihud’s Illiquidity proxy   0.4466  0.4095  0.2848  0.0433  1.5162  9598 
InvTrades   -0.9774  -0.8544  0.5011  -4.0012  -0.2231  9598   38 
Table II The Effects of Fund Types on the Propensity to Hold Securitized Bonds 
 
The table reports the estimates of a model: 
 
€ 
Hit =α + β Flow − Performance Sensitivity (alternatively Horizon)it + γ'xit +εit,  (1) 
 
where each observation represents the portfolio composition of a given mutual fund in a given quarter. The dependent variable H 
is the excess percentage ownership of the fund’s portfolio represented by securitized bonds (Panel A) or corporate bonds (Panel 
B). Sensitivity is the mutual fund’s flow-performance sensitivity. Horizon is the mutual fund’s horizon, proxied for by Turnover 
ratio or Flow volatility. x is a set of standard control variables. In both panels, in columns (1)-(3) the model is estimated using the 
Fama-MacBeth procedure. The standard errors are Newey-West, with lag length parameter equal to 4. In columns (4)-(6), the 
model is estimated as a pooled OLS with quarter fixed effects, and standard errors clustered around each fund. The sample 
includes all the mutual funds belonging to the merged Lipper eMAXX-CDA/Spectrum data set, over the period 1998Q1-2007Q2. 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
A. Holdings of Securitized Bonds 
   Fama-MacBeth  Pooled OLS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Turnover ratio  1.3535***      1.2427***     
  4.84      3.40     
Flow volatility    0.1841***      0.1442**   
    4.78      2.57   
Flow-perf. sensitivity      0.0235***      0.0288** 
      4.59      2.58 
Log(Family Size)  -0.0015  -0.0002  0.0002  -0.0018  -0.0006  -0.0004 
  -0.74  -0.09  0.13  -0.56  -0.17  -0.11 
Affiliated with comm. bank  0.0198**  0.0181**  0.0216***  0.0205  0.0202  0.0228* 
  2.57  2.69  2.93  1.58  1.53  1.73 
Past flow  0.0001  -0.1230**  -0.0008  -0.0002***  -0.0016  -0.0001*** 
  0.01  -2.15  -0.08  -3.53  -0.66  -3.23 
Fund return  -0.3157  -0.2957  -0.3113  -0.1361***  -0.1334***  -0.1420*** 
  -1.66  -1.55  -1.65  -3.18  -3.01  -3.28 
Family equity holdings  -0.0185**  -0.0189*  -0.0230**  -0.0226  -0.0255*  -0.0270* 
  -2.12  -1.93  -2.62  -1.64  -1.80  -1.93 
Mgmt fee  -0.0330***  -0.0367***  -0.0395***  -0.0441**  -0.0450**  -0.0503** 
  -4.37  -4.84  -5.17  -2.26  -2.25  -2.56 
Exp. ratio  -1.8571  -1.6070  -1.6725  -2.4794***  -2.2712***  -2.2142*** 
  -1.62  -1.45  -1.54  -3.39  -3.21  -3.10 
Actual 12b1  -2.7116  -3.0727  -2.9732  -1.5528  -2.0592  -1.9096 
  -1.29  -1.58  -1.56  -0.99  -1.31  -1.23 
Av. maturity of holdings  0.0005  0.0007  0.0006  0.0010***  0.0012***  0.0011*** 
  1.25  1.57  1.46  3.38  3.91  3.93 
No equity  0.1173***  0.1234***  0.1240***  0.1252***  0.1340***  0.1322*** 
  21.35  25.32  23.68  10.62  11.12  11.23 
Fund’s equity hold. return  0.0062  0.0003  0.0138  -0.0261**  -0.0244**  -0.0233** 
  0.20  0.01  0.43  -2.37  -2.10  -2.03 
             
Quarter fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 






N. Obs.  16252  15400  15835  16252  15400  15835 
(Average) R
2  0.14  0.13  0.14  0.11  0.11  0.11 
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Table II The Effects of Fund Types on the Propensity to Hold Securitized Bonds – cont’d 
 
B. Holdings of Corporate Bonds 
   Fama-MacBeth  Pooled OLS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Turnover ratio  -1.8692***      -1.9044***     
  -5.41      -4.12     
Flow volatility    -0.1113**      -0.0399   
    -2.04      -0.52   
Flow-perf. Sensitivity      -0.0232***       -0.0272** 
      -3.28      -1.98 
Log(Family Size)  -0.0001  -0.0012  -0.0022  0.0010  -0.0002  -0.0011 
  -0.02  -0.46  -0.85  0.24  -0.05  -0.25 
Affiliated with comm. bank  -0.0290***  -0.0309***  -0.0325***  -0.0274  -0.0305*  -0.0311* 
  -3.11  -3.22  -3.72  -1.64  -1.80  -1.84 
Past flow  0.0214  0.1425  0.0218*  0.0003***  0.0022  0.0003*** 
  1.63  1.64  1.70  5.10  0.99  4.66 
Fund return  0.3316  0.2993  0.3112  0.1771***  0.1798***  0.1823*** 
  1.04  0.92  0.97  2.67  2.60  2.72 
Family equity holdings  -0.0381***  -0.0359**  -0.0329***  -0.0345  -0.0286  -0.0283 
  -3.37  -2.61  -3.18  -1.44  -1.18  -1.17 
Mgmt fee  0.0219*  0.0182*  0.0300**  0.0557*  0.0535*  0.0642** 
  1.85  1.78  2.20  1.94  1.83  2.25 
Exp. ratio  6.8974***  7.0888***  6.7267***  5.1192***  4.8543***  4.7298*** 
  4.62  5.30  4.76  3.06  2.81  2.89 
Actual 12b1  -0.9586  -1.3660  -0.6165  0.8405  1.1335  1.4445 
  -0.47  -0.84  -0.34  0.31  0.41  0.54 
Av. maturity of holdings  -0.0010*  -0.0012**  -0.0012**  -0.0018***  -0.0020***  -0.0020*** 
  -1.92  -2.09  -2.11  -4.48  -4.99  -5.02 
No equity  0.0993***  0.0932***  0.0907***  0.0575***  0.0465**  0.0486** 
  3.33  3.20  3.01  2.76  2.19  2.30 
Fund’s equity hold. return  -0.0221  -0.0051  -0.0330  0.0391*  0.0408*  0.0391* 
  -0.33  -0.07  -0.50  1.93  1.95  1.90 
             
Quarter fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 




Clustered  by 
fund 
N. Obs.  16252  15400  15835  16252  15400  15835 
(Average) R
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Table III Mutual Fund Flows and Bond Sales after the Onset of the Crisis 
 
In Panel A, we examine pure bond funds that held both corporate bonds and securitized bonds in their portfolios prior to the crisis 
and use their portfolio changes in the last two quarters of 2007 as the dependent variable. In columns (1)-(4) the dependent 
variable is the percentage net purchases of corporate bonds (odd-numbered columns) and securitized bonds (even-numbered). In 
columns (5)-(8) the dependent variable is the negative of Log-$ Sales and columns are organized analogously. The cross section 
of sample funds are then sorted by their contemporaneous fund flows into four bins (VeryLowFlow, LowFlow, HighFlow, and 
VeryHighFlow). In columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6), the net position changes are regressed on just the four category dummies; in 
columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8), the model also includes additional fund characteristics. The row labelled F-stat reports the F-test 
statistics for the hypothesis that the paired coefficients (corporate bonds vs. securitized bonds) on the most negative flow group 
(VeryLowFlow) are equal. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
Panel B reports the estimates of a model: 
 
,      (2) 
 
where each observation corresponds to a corporate bond with data in the FINRA TRACE data set. The dependent variable is 
LogSale, the log-net sales (in thousands of dollars) of the bond by institutional investors between July 2007 and December 2007. 
LogHold denotes the log-dollar holding of the bond by institutional investors as of June 2007, and x is a vector of standard bond 
characteristics, including issuer and offering year fixed effects. Quality denotes one of three proxies for the quality of the bond: 
InvRating (the natural logarithm of the inverse of 1 + the numerical value of the bond’s S&P rating, which ranges from 0 (no 
rating) to 24 (AAA rating or higher)), the bond’s Amihud illiquidity ratio, and InvTrades (the natural logarithm of the inverse of 
the average number of daily trades of the bond over the period January-June 2007).  In all specifications, the standard errors are 
clustered  around  bond  issuers.  The  sample  includes  all  bonds  in  the  FINRA  TRACE  data  set  with  available  data  on  bond 
characteristics from the Mergent FISD data set. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels. 
 
A. Fund Flows and Bond Sales (Fund-level analysis) 
   Percentage net purchases  - Log-$ sales 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
VeryLowFlow  -0.0461**  -0.0126  -0.1123***  -0.0021  -5.7897***  0.8212  -5.3678***  0.1051 
  -2.3  -0.4  -3.33  -0.05  3.66  0.58  -3.37  0.08 
LowFlow  0.0061  0.0278  -0.0642**  0.0337  -3.7617**  -0.6552  -3.4436**  1.3056 
  0.4  1.32  -2.07  1.07  2.3  -0.45  -2.11  0.94 
HighFlow  0.0623***  0.0333  -0.0068  0.0383  -1.6623  -2.1962  -1.5584  3.1233** 
  3.39  1.16  -0.22  1.06  0.98  -1.43  -0.92  2.14 
VeryHighFlow  0.1097***  0.0733***  0.0312  0.0720**  1.698 
-
3.2612**  1.8597  3.6471*** 
  5.29  2.69  0.95  2.16  -0.99  -2.21  1.09  2.63 
Secur. h.  2007Q2        -0.1322**        -10.6865*** 
        -2.16        -6.12 
Corp. h. 2007Q2      0.0673**        -4.7014***   
      2.04        -2.63   
Affil. comm. bank      -0.0590***  -0.0432*      -1.1890*  -0.2330 
      -2.84  -1.76      -1.86  -0.24 
Log(Family size)      0.0030  0.0100*      0.0989  0.1407 
      0.86  1.77      0.52  0.79 
Fam. equity hold.      -0.1079***  -0.0076      -5.7627***  -0.4294 
      -3.65  -0.19      -3.70  -0.23 
Av. mat. of holdings      0.0009***  0.0004      -0.0066  0.0711*** 
      2.66  0.64      -0.28  3.42 
                 
F-stat (p-value)  1.06 (0.3035)  4.82** (0.0281)  6.58** (0.0103)  22.60*** (0.0000) 
St. error  White  White  White  White  White  White  White  White 
N. Obs.  550  550  550  550  550  550  550  550 
(Pseudo-)R
2  0.09  0.02  0.13  0.04  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.02   41 
 
B. Determinants of Corporate Bond Sales (Bond-level analysis) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
InvRating  1.0496**      1.0712** 
  2.14      2.25 
Amihud    -0.9552***    -0.7488*** 
    -4.54    -3.56 
InvTrades      -0.4114***  -0.2938*** 
      -5.26  -3.72 
No Rating [1 = NO]  -3.1242**  0.0897  0.0967  -3.2439** 
  -2.01  0.95  1.02  -2.15 
Bond is not held by institutional investors [1 = NO]  4.8895***  4.6887***  4.7389***  4.6379*** 
  25.10  24.01  25.04  24.34 
LogHold (2007Q2)  1.0148***  0.9738***  0.9840***  0.9647*** 
  33.00  31.90  32.83  31.98 
Bond face value  0.1919***  0.1640***  0.1756***  0.1492*** 
  5.99  4.76  5.27  4.29 
Covenants [1 = YES]  1.1209***  1.0253***  1.0170***  1.0459*** 
  4.61  4.33  4.37  4.36 
CovIndex  -0.1055  0.0722  0.0346  -0.1165 
  -0.25  0.20  0.09  -0.27 
Log(Months to maturity)  -0.3952***  -0.3226***  -0.3886***  -0.3348*** 
  -9.23  -8.39  -9.58  -8.78 
         
Issuer fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Offering year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Standard error cluster  Issuer  Issuer  Issuer  Issuer 
N. Obs.  8148  8148  8148  8148 
R
2  0.91  0.88  0.91  0.91   42 
Table IV Changes in Mutual Fund Holdings of Securitized and Corporate Bonds At the Onset of the Crisis 
 
Panel A reports the estimates of a model: 
 
,        (3) 
 
The dependent variable   is the change, between 2007Q2 and 2007Q4, in the fraction of the fund’s portfolio represented by 
securitized bonds (columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6)) or corporate bonds (columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8)) in excess of the fund class 
average. Horizon is the mutual fund’s horizon, proxied for by Turnover ratio (odd-numbered columns) or Flow volatility (even-
numbered columns). x is a set of standard mutual fund characteristics, expressed in their values as of June 2007. Horizon is 
expressed in its value as of June 2007 (columns (1)-(4)) or as of December 2006 (columns (5)-(8)).  
 




In the odd-numbered columns, the dependent variable ΔC is the fund’s excess sales (defined analogously to   above) of 
investment-grade bonds (High). In the even-numbered columns, the dependent variable is the fund’s excess sales of junk bonds 
(Low). Horizon is the mutual fund’s horizon, proxied for by Turnover ratio (columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6)) or Flow volatility 
(columns (3)-(4) and (5)-(6)). x is a set of standard control variables as in Panel A. F-test statistics and p-values for the 
difference between the Horizon coefficients for investment-grade and junk bonds are provided in the row labelled “F-stat (p-
value)”. The sample includes all the mutual funds belonging to the merged Lipper eMAXX-CDA/Spectrum data set, over the 
period 2007Q2-2007Q4. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
   43 
Table IV Changes in Mutual Fund Holdings of Securitized and Corporate Bonds At the Onset of the Crisis – cont’d 
 
 Panel A. Changes in Holdings of Corporate Bonds and Securitized Bonds 
  Fund horizon as of June 2007  Fund horizon as of December 2006 
   Securitized Bonds  Corporate Bonds  Securitized Bonds  Corporate Bonds 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Turnover ratio  1.1354**    -1.2015***    0.9809**    -1.0638**   
  2.41    -2.61    2.09    -2.22   
Flow volatility    0.0194***    -0.0978**    0.1439    -0.3411* 
    10.13    -2.04    0.94    -1.81 
Secur. h.  2007Q2  -0.0703***  -0.1334***      -0.0696***  -0.0807***     
  -3.73  -5.35      -3.48  -3.57     
Corp. h. 2007Q2      -0.0536***  -0.1091***      -0.0498***  -0.0520** 
      -3.05  -4.18      -2.60  -2.24 
Affil. comm. bank  0.0176*  0.0308***  -0.0048  -0.0310**  0.0197**  0.0237**  -0.0060  -0.0214 
  1.79  2.66  -0.41  -2.32  1.97  2.03  -0.52  -1.59 
Log(Family size)  0.0047**  0.0033  -0.0014  0.0014  0.0043*  0.0048**  -0.0015  -0.0032 
  2.15  1.37  -0.56  0.47  1.95  2.03  -0.58  -1.12 
Past flow  0.0349***  -0.0241***  -0.0382***  0.2812*  -0.0487  0.0456  0.0469  0.0007 
  8.73  -4.96  -10.09  1.78  -0.51  0.56  0.60  0.01 
Fund return  -0.4048*  -0.4537*  0.4436*  0.2713  -0.4752**  -0.5170**  0.4964*  0.4302 
  -1.76  -1.81  1.66  0.87  -2.03  -2.04  1.81  1.46 
Fam. equity hold.  0.0141  0.0427***  0.0063  -0.0338**  0.0145  0.0270*  0.0081  -0.0108 
  1.11  2.98  0.46  -1.98  1.12  1.88  0.58  -0.65 
Mgmt fee  0.0008  0.0000  -0.0049***  -0.0039***  0.0007  0.0006  -0.0047***  -0.0042*** 
  1.12  -0.03  -5.24  -3.05  0.90  0.73  -4.97  -3.44 
Exp. ratio  -0.9977  -2.4503**  1.5340  4.1035***  -0.4825  -1.5858  1.1322  2.8026** 
  -0.85  -2.00  1.16  2.70  -0.42  -1.38  0.84  2.00 
Actual 12b1  0.0002*  0.0003**  -0.0002  -0.0003*  0.0002  0.0002*  -0.0001  -0.0002 
  1.91  2.06  -1.43  -1.90  1.36  1.90  -0.95  -1.41 
Av. maturity of 
holdings  0.0002  0.0010***  0.0000  -0.0010***  0.0002  0.0004  0.0000  -0.0002 
  0.78  3.44  0.06  -3.00  0.82  1.34  0.07  -0.69 
No equity  -0.0104  0.0012  0.0259*  0.0257  -0.0168  -0.0174  0.0307**  0.0339** 
  -0.79  0.08  1.93  1.43  -1.30  -1.19  2.22  2.04 
Fund’s equity ret.  -0.0870  -0.0788  0.0490  -0.0154  -0.0567  0.0318  0.0182  -0.0528 
  -0.85  -0.70  0.37  -0.11  -0.56  0.30  0.14  -0.38 
                 
Standard error  White  White  White  White  White  White  White  White 
N. Obs.  517  577  517  577  494  511  494  511 
R
2  0.10  0.11  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.06  0.05 
                 
Panel B. Sales of Corporate Bonds, by Ratings 
  Fund horizon as of June 2007  Fund horizon as of December 2006 
 Rating  Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  Low  High 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Turnover ratio  -1.2922***  -1.0967***      -0.8574***  -0.7205***     
  -3.33  -4.16      -3.15  -3.59     
Flow volatility      -0.2475***  -0.0790*      -0.1533**  -0.0464 
      -3.16  -1.70      -2.03  -1.39 
                 
[Control variables suppressed]               
                 
F-stat  (p-value)  0.21 (0.6500)  3.96** (0.0467)  0.24 (0.6276)  2.93* (0.0869) 
Standard error  White  White  White  White  White  White  White  White 
N. Obs.  508  501  568  567  493  494  550  552 
R

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   50 
Table VIII Relationship between mutual funds’ and insurance companies’ trades 
 
Panel A reports the estimates of a model: 
 
    (8) 
 
where each observation is a corporate bond i in quarter t. The dependent variable MF_Netbuy is the net purchases of the bond by all mutual 
funds in column (1). In columns (2) and (3) they are the net purchases by short-horizon, exposed mutual funds (i.e., funds that have a short-
horizon with exposure to securitized bonds above the median. We use two proxies for horizon – High Turnover (column (2)) and High Flow 
volatility (column (3)). In columns (4) and (5) they are the net purchases by all funds except the short-horizon, exposed funds. MF_Netbuy is 
calculated as the net purchases of bond i by the funds divided by the total institutional holdings of the bond (holdings of mutual funds plus 
holdings of insurance companies) as of the previous quarter. INS_Netbuy is the net purchases of the bond by insurance companies, again divided 
by the total institutional holdings of the bond. Crisis is an indicator equal to one for dates between 2007Q3 and 2008Q1. x is a vector of standard 
bond characteristics. The last row of the table reports the F-test statistic for H0: β1 = β2. The sample is for the period 1998Q1-2008Q1. 
Panel B reports the estimates of a model: 
 
where MF_Netbuy is the net purchases of bond i by funds that experience below-median flows over the last six months of 2007 (LowFlow 
funds) in column (1) and HighFlow funds in column (2). INS_Netbuy is defined as above, and x is a set of standard bond characteristics, 
including offering year effects. In both panels, the symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
A. Correlations of mutual fund and insurance company trades, before and after the onset of the crisis  
       









  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
INS_Netbuy X (1-Crisis)  0.0892***  0.0010***  0.0016***  0.0862***  0.0835*** 
  11.18  5.05  5.03  10.75  10.56 
INS_Netbuy X Crisis  0.2075***  0.0041***  0.0068***  0.1789***  0.1735*** 
  8.86  5.03  5.29  7.69  7.81 
           
[Control variables suppressed]         
Bond and quarter fixed effect  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Standard error cluster   Bond  Bond  Bond  Bond  Bond 
N. Obs.  68233  67744  67718  67077  67069 
R
2  0.06  0.05  0.05  0.06  0.06 
F-stat for H0: β1 = β2  23.00***  15.51***  14.01***  14.69***  14.39*** 
 
 






  (1)  (2) 
     
INS_Netbuy  0.0008***  0.0017*** 
  2.76  2.67 
     
[Control variables suppressed]     
Offering year fixed effect  Y  Y 
Standard error  White  White 
N. Obs.  9598  9539 
R
2  0.02  0.02 
F-stat for H0: βLowFlow = βHighFlow  5.75 (0.0165)   51 
Table IX The structural break in institutional trades and the correlation of the yield spread to trades 
 




where Netbuy is either INS_Netbuy (column (1)) or MF_Netbuy (column (2)). INS_Netbuy is the aggregate net purchases of bond i by all 
insurance companies, divided by the prior-quarter total holdings of insurance companies plus mutual funds. MF_Netbuy is analogously defined. 
Crisis is an indicator variable equal to one for dates between 2007Q3 and 2008Q1. The last row reports the F-test statistic for Ho:  . 




where INST_Netbuy is the sum of INS_Netbuy and MF_Netbuy, Crisis is as defined above, and x is a of standard bond characteristics, including 
bond and quarter fixed effects. The last row reports the F-test statistic for Ho:  . 
In columns (4)-(5), the table reports the estimates of a model: 
 
€ 
ΔYSit =α + β1INS_Netbuyit × 1−Crisist ( )+ β2 INS_Netbuyit ×Crisist + +β3 MFit × 1−Crisist ( )+ β4 MFit ×Crisist + ′  γ xit +εit 
 
where Crisis, INS_Netbuy are defined as above, and MF is either MF_Netbuy (column (4)), defined as above, or LowFlow_Netbuy (column (5)), 
defined as the net purchases of bond i by mutual funds that experience below-median flows in the quarter, divided by the prior-quarter total 
holdings of insurance companies plus mutual funds. x is a of standard bond characteristics, including individual bond and quarter fixed effects. 
The last row reports the F-test statistic for Ho:  . 
The sample is for the period 1998Q1-2008Q1. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
Dependent Variable  INS_Netbuy  MF_Netbuy       
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1 - Crisis  -0.0302***  -0.0233***       
  -109.75  -66.95       
Crisis  -0.0266***  -0.0436***       
  -54.88  -53.83       
INST_Netbuy X (1-Crisis)      0.1099     
      0.80     
INST_Netbuy X Crisis      -2.3966***     
      -9.86     
INS_Netbuy X (1-Crisis)        -0.1709  -0.1258 
        -1.39  -1.01 
INS_Netbuy X Crisis        -0.6031*  -0.6001* 
        -1.83  -1.78 
MF_Netbuy X (1-Crisis)        0.6210***   
        3.51   
MF_Netbuy X Crisis        -3.4781***   
        -12.11   
LowFlow_Netbuy X (1-Crisis)          -0.3964 
          -1.01 
LowFlow_Netbuy X Crisis          -5.1208*** 
          -5.73 
[Control variables suppressed]           
Bond and quarter fixed effects  N  N  Y  Y  Y 
Standard error cluster at  Bond  Bond  Bond  Bond  Bond 
N. Obs.  63330  63757  63520  63137  62231 
R
2  0.23  0.19  0.11  0.16  0.15 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.  53 
 
 
Figure 2 Cumulative return of a Long-short Portfolio of Low-rated Corporate Bonds with and without Exposure    
The figure plots the cumulative monthly return on a portfolio that is short on the below-investment grade bonds whose mutual fund holders 
have high exposure to securitized bonds, and long on a set of issuer- and duration-matched bonds without the exposure, over the period 2004-
2007. 
  We define “high exposure” as those corporate bonds whose average mutual fund holder’s exposure to securitized bonds is in the top 
30% in either of the previous two quarters. We place these bonds in the short portfolio if and only if it has a matching bond without a high 
exposure satisfying the following criteria: (i) the matching bond is issued by the same issuer firm; and (ii) the time to maturity of the matching 
bond is between 50% and 150% of the time to maturity of the shorted bond. We place these matching bonds in the long portfolio. The long-
short portfolio’s monthly return is then the long portfolio’s monthly return (rebalanced to be equal-weighted each month) minus the short 
portfolio’s monthly return (similarly rebalanced).  Returns on individual corporate bonds are constructed from the secondary market prices, as 
reported by TRACE. In each period, bond returns are also winsorized at 1%.  
 
 
 